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GENOCIDE: THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN
AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
Matthew Lippman*
INTRODUCTION
This essay revisits the Israeli prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, a
central architect of Nazi Germany's Final Solution of the Jewish question.
The Eichmann trial stands as a seminal step in the development of interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law and presents the profound juris-
prudential issue as to whether legal standards and procedures may be
compromised in an effort to achieve a desired and deserved criminal
conviction.'
Professor Lon L. Fuller composed the hypothetical, The Problem
Of The Grudge Informer, to highlight the central issues raised in Eichmann
and in other post-World War H war crimes prosecutions. 2 Fuller described
the election of "Headman" as President of a mythical Republic and the se-
curing of a parliamentary majority by "Headman's" Purple Shirt Party. This
electoral success was based on a campaign of false promises, misrepresen-
tation and physical intimidation. The new government retained the coun-
try's constitution, political structure, statutory provisions and continued to
conduct elections. Judges, however, were pressured into perverted interpre-
tations of the criminal code, secret and retroactive statutes were adopted,
opposition parties were abolished and dissidents were intimidated and
jailed. An amnesty resulted in the release of incarcerated Purple Shirts.
Property was forcefully appropriated by members of the Purple Shirts and
these seizures later were ratified by retroactive statutes.
3
A number of "grudge informers" reported acts declared criminal by
Purple Shirt authorities, including criticizing the government, listening to
foreign radio broadcasts, associating with dissidents and hoarding dried
eggs and failing to report lost identification papers. Conviction could result
in an administrative or judicial sentence of death. Following the overthrow
* Matthew Lippman (Ph.D. Northwestern; J.D. American; LL.M. Harvard); Pro-
fessor, University of Illinois at Chicago
1 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 593 (1958). See also Lon L. Fuller, Postivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958). See generally Lon L.
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949).
2 Lon L. Fuller, The Problem of the Grudge Informer, in LON L. FULLER, THE
MORAL=rr OF LAW 245 (rev. ed. 1964).
3 Id. at 245-247.
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of the Purple Shirts, the public demanded the punishment of the "grudge
informers." 4
Fuller presents the diverse views of five fictitious governmental ad-
visers as to whether the new regime should retroactively prosecute the
"grudge informants." One queried whether this would replicate the arbi-
trary lawlessness of the Purple Shirts.5 Another of Fuller's fictional advisers
argued that the Purple Shirt regime existed in a distinct and different era
which should be viewed as immune from legal scrutiny and judgment. 6 Le-
gal intervention also risked the eruption of antiquated animosities and
grievances. 7 Another adviser counseled against countenancing the acts of
the "grudge informers" and advocated the adoption of a retroactive criminal
statute.8 The final member of Fuller's board of governmental advisers as-
sumed a neutral stance and favored the toleration of extra-legal retributive
acts. 9
Some of these same choices confronted Israel. Should Eichmann be
subjected to trial under a retroactive law adopted following the commission
of his crimes? Was it proper to judge acts undertaken in a distinct, different
and largely lawless era? This dilemma was exacerbated by the fact that
Eichmann's alleged offenses had been committed against citizens of Euro-
pean States prior to the establishment of Israel. On what basis could the
fledgling Jewish State assert jurisdiction? Was Israel the proper forum for
such a trial? Would any prosecution and punishment inevitably become in-
fluenced and infused by politics and degenerate into a "show trial?" Is the
prosecution of international crimes beyond the capacity of a single nation-
state? Should the defense of superior orders or adherence to law be recog-
nized? May legal procedures be compromised in order to achieve substan-
tive justice, particularly in light of the scope and severity of Eichmann's
crimes. Might it be preferable to assassinate Eichmann and to deprive him
of the procedural justice that he denied his victims?10
This essay begins with a brief review of Adolf Eichmann's role in
the Nazi regime and describes Eichmann's abduction from Argentina and
the subsequent United Nations Security Council debate. The testimony at
the Eichmann trial, which provides a unique insight into the Final Solution
is then discussed, followed by an outline of the verdict and sentencing. In
4 Id. at 247.
5 See id. at 247-249.
6 See id. at 250.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 251-252.
9 See id. at 252-253.
10 See generally PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964).
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conclusion, the international legal issues involved in the trial are reviewed
and some summary observations are sketched.
I. EICHMANN AND THE FINAL SOLUTION
Despite Adolf Eichmann's central role in the Nazi conspiratorial
campaign to exterminate the Jews, he remains a shadowy and skeletal fig-
ure in the historiography of the Third Reich." Eichmann spent most of his
childhood in Linz, Austria, and completed two years at a post-secondary
vocational school. 12 He seemingly mindlessly migrated to membership in
the National Socialist Party and in October 1934, following Hitler's ascen-
dancy to power, volunteered for service in the Head Office of the Security
Service (S.D.) in Berlin. 13 After spending several months in the Department
1 For instance, German historian Joachim C. Fest makes devotes little attention to
Eichmann in his profile of the major figures of the Third Reich. See JOACHIM C.
FEST, THE FACE OF THE THIRD REICH PORTAITS OF THE NAZI LEADERSHIP (Michael
Bullock trans., 1999) (1964).
12 Attorney-General of the Government Of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 18
(Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 1961)(1968) [hereinafter Dist. Ct. Judgment] aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277
(Sup. Ct., May 29, 1962)(1968) [hereinafter Sup. Ct. Judgment]. Adolf Eichmann
was born in 1906 in Solingen in the Rhineland Germany. His family moved to
Austria in 1914. Eichmann's father, a devout Evangelical Christian, worked as a
bookkeeper in a local company. He later lost money in various business ventures,
including a mining company in which the young Eichmann was employed. Adolf
Eichmann was forced in young adulthood to seek an independent career, but was
fired from his position with the Socony Vacuum Company in 1933. He joined the
Austrian National-Socialist Party in 1933 and, following Hitler's ascendancy to
power, Eichmann migrated to Germany. In November 1933, he enlisted for military
service in the Austrian S.S. unit in exile and received military training. After reach-
ing the rank of sergeant, he voluntered for service at the Head Office of the Secur-
ity Service in Berlin. See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra at 84-85.
13 Dist. Ct. Judgement, supra note 12, at 85. The National Socialist bureaucratic
structure was complex with overlapping State and Party authority over the same
areas. The S.D. (Security Service of the Reichsfuhrer S.S.) was the intelligence
service of the Nazi Party Secret Service, S.S., and, later, of the entire National
Socialist Party. The Head of the S.D., Reinhard Heydrich, in 1936, also was ap-
pointed to direct the State Security Police which was comprised of the State Secret
Police (Gestapo) and the Criminal Police. Heydrich's superior was Minister of Inte-
rior, Heinrich Himmler, who in this capacity headed the German Police. Himmler
also was leader of the S.S. The unification of the S.D. with the Security Police was
completed by Himmler's order of September 27, 1939 creating the Head Office for
Reich Security (RSHA). RSHA was comprised of six (later seven) offices. The
Gestapo was merged into this new structure as Bureau IV, headed by Heinrich
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for Research into Freemasonry, he shifted to Section II 112, "Jews."1 4 In
March 1938, Eichmann was appointed Referent (section head) for Zionist
Affairs which was concerned with intelligence and worked in close co-oper-
ation with the Jewish Department in the Gestapo (114B). 15 Eichmann's
superiors were impressed with his knowledge of Jewry and he went so far
as to study Hebrew and Yiddish.16 Eichmann also traveled to Palestine, es-
tablished an important diplomatic alliance with the virulently anti-semitic
Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Husseini, and regularly lectured the S.S.
and army commanders on the structure and aims of World Zionism.1 7
Eichmann, following the annexation of Austria in 1938, was sent to
Vienna to administer the newly-established Center for Emigration of Aus-
trian Jews. 18 He displayed administrative acumen in coordinating the vari-
ous governmental authorities involved in Jewish emigration. 19 Eichmann
described the process as resembling an automated factory in which a Jew
was processed and emerged at "the other end without any money, without
any rights, and only a passport in which it says: 'You must leave the coun-
try within a fortnight: otherwise-you will go to a concentration camp. '"'20
In a letter to a friend, Eichmann boasted that the Jews "are entirely in my
hands, they do not dare to take a single step without asking me first."'" In
the end, he succeeded in pressuring a substantial percentage of Austria's
150,000 Jews to emigrate. 22 The Reich financed the evacuation of Jews
without means through the confiscation of Jewish property, the extraction
Mueller. The mission of Bureau IV was "combating opponents." The Criminal Po-
lice was transformed into Bureau V and the intelligence duties of the S.D. were
transferred to Bureaus II, 11 and VI of the RSHA. Id. at 85. RSHA, in turn, was
one of the twelve main offices of the S.S. In November 1939, the officials of the
Gestapo and Criminal Police received ranks in the S.S. See id. at 86. Heydrich
served as head of the RSHA until his assassination in June 1942. In December
1942, he was replaced by Ernst Kaltenbrunner, an Austrian acquaintance of Eich-
mann. id.
14 Id.
15 See id. The Gestapo possessed executive as well as intelligence powers. Eich-
mann's performance merited a promotion to the officer rank (Untersturmfuhrer).
See id.
16 See id. at 86-87.
17 See id. at 87.
18 See id. at 88.
19 See id.
20 Id. at 89.
21 Id. at 90.
22 See id. at 91.
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of funds from abroad, and unfavorable rates of exchange on the currency
permitted emigrating Jews.23 Eichmann was next sent to Prague, where he
devoted himself to organizing and financing the evacuation of the Jews
within the newly-established German Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia.24
Eichmann returned to Berlin following the invasion of Poland, in
September 1939, where he organized the evacuation of Jews from Germany
to Poland. 25 In February 1940, 1,300 Jews were deported from the Old
Reich to Lublin Poland; 230 expired in transit.26 The invasion of Poland by
Germany and Russia resulted in two million additional Jews falling under
the command and control of the Reich.27 An ambitious plan was initiated
which involved deporting Jews and Poles resident within the newly-created
and annexed Warthe District in the East (incorporated Poland) to the so-
called Government General (unincorporated Poland).28 Eichmann super-
vised the sealing of Jews into railroad cars with little regard for heat, hy-
giene or provisions. 29
In 1940, Eichmann sought to alleviate the overcrowding in Polish
Jewish ghettos through the creation of a Jewish State in the inhospitable
locale of Nisko on the River San in the Government General.30 The Jews
were unceremoniously left to fend for themselves in withering winter
weather without food, water or shelter.3 1 The plan faltered and was aban-
doned; only three hundred of the initial group of one thousand returned to
Austria.32 Eichmann pursued an even more adventurous project in 1942,
when he devised detailed preparations for the settlement of four million
Jews on the island of Madagascar. 33
23 See id.
24 See id. at 92. Eichmann's efforts resulted in his promotion to captain in the S.S.
Id.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 98-99. In October 1940, all the 7,450 Jews of the district of Baden
and the Saar Palantinate were expelled to the unoccupied territory of France. See id.
at 101.
27 See id. at 93.
28 See id. at 97. Eichmann was in charge of this effort which was placed under the
newly created Bureau IVD4, charged with emigration and evacuation. Id.
29 See id. at 98.
30 See id. at 95.
31 See id. at 95-96.
32 See id. at 96.
33 See id. at 100-101.
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As Hitler contemplated the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of
1941, Eichmann was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and appointed to head
Bureau IVB4, Jewish Affairs.34 He later was formally vested with authority
over the confiscation of Jewish property and the revocation of German na-
tionality.35 In October 1941, a meeting was held between Reinhard
Heydrich, Chief of the Head Office for Reich Security (RSHA), Eichmann
and others, at which plans were promulgated for the comprehensive expul-
sion of Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Mo-
ravia. 36 Eichmann then organized, attended, and transcribed the minutes of
the Wannsee Conference of January 1942, which established the foundation
for the Final Solution of the Jewish question throughout Europe. 37 Wannsee
formally replaced the policy of emigration abroad with evacuation to the
East for purposes of forced labor and "appropriate treatment. 38
Eichmann was recognized at the conference as the principal person
within RSHA for all matters connected with the Final Solution of the "Jew-
ish problem."39 His activities now encompassed the entire European conti-
nent; he coordinated arrangements for the arrest, selection, transport and
reception of Jews and the seizure and sequestration of Jewish property, in-
suring that the entire process was recorded and financed. 40 This extended to
numerous countries ranging from France, where 52,000 Jews were evacu-
ated;41 Norway, in which only thirteen of the 750 Jews deported survived;42
Slovakia which suffered the extermination of 70,000 of the country's
90,000 Jews; 43 Croatia which witnessed the survival of only 1,500 of
34 See id. at 102.
35 See id. at 103. In 1944, Eichmann's section was provided with a new designa-
tion, IVA4. Id.
36 See id. at 106-109.
37 See id. at 108-110. In July 1941, Himmler charged Heydrich with making all
necessary preparations for the "general solution of the Jewish problem within the
German sphere of influence in Europe." Id. at 104-105. Heydrich also was assigned
to plan to implement the "desired final solution of the Jewish problem." Id. The
Reich Nationality Law of 1941 provided that a Jews resident abroad forfeited his or
her German citizenship. The property of these Jews was subject to confiscation.
This resulted in deported Jews losing both citizenship and property rights. Id. at
109.
38 Id. at 109-112.
39 Id. at 113.
40 See id. at 115-121.
41 See id. at 121, 123.
42 See id. at 125-126.
43 See id. at 127-128.
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30,000 Jews;44 Serbia, where only 5,000 of a population of 47,000 Jews
survived;45 Greece, in which only 10,00 of 77,000 Jews were left alive; 46
and Italy, in which only 600 of the 7,500 Jews who were evacuated sur-
vived.47 Eichmann's commitment to cleansing the Jews from Europe is il-
lustrated by a 1942 memorandum, that recorded the cancellation of a train
from Bordeaux in France due to the fact that local authorities only managed
to arrest 150 stateless Jews. 48 Eichmann reportedly reacted by characteriz-
ing this as a "disgraceful" event which undermined the "prestige" of his
office.49 He later did not hesitate to order the deportation of 4,000 French
Jewish children separated from their parents to Auschwitz. 50 In September
1941, the German Foreign Ministry in Serbia sought guidance on the dispo-
sition of 8,000 Jews; the file recorded that "Eichmann proposes killing by
shooting." 51 Eichmann consistently opposed the emigration of Jews to Pal-
estine, on one occasion exerting diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Bulga-
ria to refuse to issue transit visas to thousands of Jewish children. 52
The near completion of the cleansing of European Jewry freed
Eichmann to turn his attention to the remaining concentration of stateless
and domestic Jews in Hungary, which had been occupied by Germany in
March 1944.53 Despite countless barriers and challenges, Eichmann suc-
ceeded in evacuating roughly two-thirds of Hungary's 800,000 Jews.54 Be-
tween April 16, 1944 and July 9, 1944 alone, 434,351 Jews were
transported in 147 freight cars to Auschwitz55 As the Allied Powers landed
in Normandy, in June 1944, Hungarian Regent Miklos Horthy was per-
suaded by international pressure to halt the deportations. 56 This frustrated
Eichmann's aspiration to evacuate the entire Jewish population of Budapest
and, when Horthy halted a train at the border carrying 1,500 Jews, Eich-
mann responded by defiantly deporting the Jews. 57 In August, as the victory
44 See id. at 128-129.
45 See id. at 129, 131.
46 See id. at 132-133.
47 See id.at 133-134.
48 See id. at 122.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 123.
51 Id. at 130.
52 See id. at 195-196.
53 See id. at 137.
54 See id. at 138.
55 See id. at 139.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 140.
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of the Allied Powers became increasingly apparent, Himmiler announced
the termination of Hungarian transports.5 8 Eichmann, however, was em-
boldened by the installation of a sympathetic fascist regime in Hungary and,
unwilling to be stymied by the Allied bombing of railroad lines, force-
marched over 25,000 Jews on a murderous eight-day trek to the Austrian
border. 59
Eichmann' s ability to deport a steady stream of Jews was dependent
on the expeditious extermination of those interned in the concentration
camps.60 The mass execution of Jews by killing squads in Poland and Rus-
sia proved ineffective, inefficient and threatened to undermine morale.61
Eichmann agreed to the asphyxiation of victims by exhaust fumes pumped
into the passenger compartments of vans.62 He visited the camp at Chelmno
and witnessed the crowding of Jews into trucks, the removal of the corpses,
and the extraction of gold from their teeth. 63 Eichmann also was consulted
on an even more sophisticated scheme of slaughter; the utilization of
Zyklon-B gas to fuel the killing chambers in concentration camps.64 On
one occasion, he participated in the selection of individuals from the There-
sienstadt ghetto for extermination in Auschwitz. 65 Eichmann conceded that
he visited Auschwitz on at least five occasion and viewed the mass burn-
ings of bodies.66 He also was involved in the transfer of eighty inmates from
Auschwitz to Natzweiler, where they were exterminated in order to com-
plete a skeleton collection at the Institute for Racial Research at the Univer-
sity of Strasbourg. 67
In 1944, the Reich bestowed three prestigious awards on Eichmann,
including the Distinguished War Service Cross, First Class, with Swords. 68
Dieter Wislicency, one of Eichmann's chief assistants, testified at Nurem-
berg that Eichmann proclaimed that he would "leap laughing into the
58 See id. at 141.
59 See id. at 141-142.
60 See id. at 153.
61 See id. at 154, 177-179.
62 See id. at 154, 210-212 . See also Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 338.
63 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 154-155.
64 See id. at 183-84, 212-16. See also Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 338-
339.
65 See Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 339.
66 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 183.
67 See id. at 202-203.
68 See id. at 226.
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grave" with "extraordinary satisfaction" over having been responsible for
the extermination of five million Jews. 69
II. POST-WAR YEARS
As the Allied Powers advanced into the Reich, Adolf Eichmann,
abandoned by his superiors and disillusioned by their lack of resolve to
resist, fled to Austria.70 He was arrested in 1945 by an American patrol,
escaped, was re-arrested, and again fled in anticipation that he would be
identified as a seminal figure in the Final Solution and prosecuted at Nu-
remberg.71 Eichmann worked as a lumberjack in Lower Saxony for three
years under the name Otto Heninger and was subsequently spirited by a
shadowy underground organization of former members of the S.S. and a
sympathetic Catholic cleric to Argentina, a post-war haven for Nazi nota-
bles. 72 By 1960, Eichmann achieved a sense of stability, working as a fore-
man at a Mercedes-Benz plant in Buenos Aires and constructing a non-
descript house in which he lived with his wife and children. 73 Eichmann and
his wife made no sustained effort to conceal their identity and Eichmann
went so far as to dictate his memoirs to a sympathetic Argentinian newspa-
per editor, Willen Sassen. 74
Israeli intelligence continued to receive reports that Eichmann was
residing in various Arab States. 75 The fledgling Jewish State, however, was
preoccupied with self-defense and with the immigration of Jews from the
Arab States. 76 In 1957, the Israelis received credible information that Eich-
mann was residing in Buenos Aires. 77 This provided the catalyst for a com-
plex and convoluted chase over the next three years which culminated in
Eichmann's capture on May 11, 1960.78 He was interrogated for over a
69 MOSHE PEARLMAN, THE CAPTURE AND TIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 11 (1983).
70 See Zvi AHARONI & WILHELM DIETL, OPERATION EICHMANN PURSUIT AND
CAPTURE 44 (1997).
71 See AHARoM & DimTL, supra note 70, at 45-46. See also PEARLMAN, supra
note 69, at 29-30;
72 See AHARoNi & DmTL, supra note 70, at 51-55.
73 See id. at 100-01. See also PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 33-36.
74 See AHARoNi & DImTL, supra note 70, at 72-73.
75 See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 273 (1968).
76 AHARoNI & DIEaL, supra note 70, at 148.
77 See id. at 78-79.
78 See id. at 79-138. See also HAUSNER, supra note 75, at 273-275. The Israeli
authorities were pressured by various influential individuals who were pursuing
Eichmann. This included Fritz Bauer, State Attorney General of Hesse and famed
Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal. See AHARONI & DImTL, supra note 70, at 84-87.
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week and flown to Israel.79 Prior to leaving Argentina, Eichmann drafted
and signed a statement, dated May 1960, stating that he was "willing to go
to Israel and face proceedings" and that this declaration was an expression
of his "own free will." 80
III. TiH DIPLOMATIC DEBATE
On May 23, 1961, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion an-
nounced the apprehension of Adolf Eichman, "one of the greatest of Nazi
war criminals," who together with other German leaders, was responsible
for the "final solution of the Jewish question."'8 1 Ben Gurion informed the
Knesset that Eichmann was under arrest in Israel and would shortly be
placed on trial.
82
79 See AHARONI & DIETL, supra note 70, at 139-160.
80 Reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 31-32, U.N.
Doc. S/4342 (1960)(Note verbale Dated 3 June 1960 From The Embassy Of Israel
In Buenos Aires To The Ministry For Foreign Affairs And Religion Of The Argen-
tine Republic). Eichmann wrote that he desired to provide a "straightforward ac-
count of the facts" of his service in Germany in the interests of "future
generations." In a revealing comment he noted that it was "futile to attempt to go
on evading justice" and that "I wish at last to achieve inner peace." Id. at 32.
Hannah Arendt notes that the Israelis may have had good grounds for believing that
there were few meaningful alternatives to kidnapping Eichmann. Argentina and
Israel had not entered into an extradition treaty. Argentina thus was not legally
compelled to hand Eichmann over for trial. In addition, the Argentinians had a
history of refusing to cooperate in the trial of Nazi war criminals. The West Ger-
man government, for example, unsuccessfully sought the extradition of Josef
Mengele, infamous for having conducted medical experiments at Auschwitz. Ar-
gentina also established a fifteen year statute of limitations on offenses associated
with World War II. This expired on May 7, 1960. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICH-
MANN IN JERUSALEM A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 264 (rev. ed.
1992)(1963). Following Eichmann's arrest the Jewish community in Argentina and
in other South American countries was targeted for vandalism, bombings and beat-
ings. A young women who assisted the Israelis was murdered and the daughter of
the owner of home where Eichmann was detained was sexually abused, tortured
and a swastika was burned into her breast with cigarettes. See ALAN LEVY, THE
WIESENTHAL FILE 134 (1993).
81 PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 60, 64. Israel subsequently claimed that the opera-
tion had been carried out by volunteers. Zvi Aharoni, a central character in the
kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann, characterized this as "pure fiction." AHARONI &
DIETL, supra note 70, at 169.
82 PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 60.
THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN
On June 1, Argentine Foreign Minister Diogenes Taboado called
Israeli Ambassador Arveh Levavi and requested "a concrete and official
declaration on reports that Eichmann had been captured in Argentina. '83
Taboado added that in the event that "it is proved that an act violating inter-
national law was committed within Argentine territory my government will
adopt measures in accordance with the nature of the case."'84
Israel responded to the Argentinian inquiry with a note verbale.85
The Israelis contended that they had been unaware prior to the receipt of the
Argentinian inquiry that Eichmann had been apprehended in Argentina. 86
They explained that Eichmann had been seized by volunteers who had been
searching for the infamous mass murderer of the Jews for the past fifteen
years. 87 These private individuals traced Eichmann to Argentina where he
had been living under an assumed name and he voluntarily accompanied his
captors to Israel. 88 The Israelis stressed that Eichmann penned a letter while
in Argentina in which he expressed his willingness to stand trial in Israel.89
He wrote that he desired "to give a straightforward account of the facts of
his last years of service in Germany so that a true picture of the facts may
be passed to future generations" and that he might achieve "inner peace." 90
The Israeli note expressed regret in the event that the volunteers
violated Argentine law or sovereignty. 91 The Jewish State importuned the
Argentinians to consider the special significance of bringing to trial the in-
dividual responsible for the murder of millions, and requested that due
weight be accorded to the fact that the volunteers were themselves Holo-
caust survivors.92
In order to deter further diplomatic disagreement, Israeli Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion sent a letter to President Arturo Frondizi of
83 Id. at 64.
84 Id. Argentina's assertive response, in part, was motivated by a desire to detract
attention from the fact that Eichmann entered the country illegally. This incident
also might draw attention to the fact that other Nazi war criminals entered and were
living in Argentina. Id. at 63-64.
85 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 31, U.N. Doc. S/4342 (Note
verbale dated 3 June 1960 from the Embassy of Israel in Buenos Aires to the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs and Religion of the Argentine Republic).
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 32.
91 See id.
92 See id.
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Argentina, dated June 7, 1960.93 Ben-Gurion reiterated that he did not un-
derestimate the seriousness of the "formal violation" of Argentinian law.94
He nevertheless requested Argentina to understand that the aim of the vol-
unteers was to prosecute before an Israeli court, Adolf Eichmann, the indi-
vidual responsible for the "unparalleled crimes" of the Holocaust.95 There
could be no doubt concerning the "lofty motives," the "imperative moral
force" and the "depth of feeling" which motivated the individuals who ap-
prehended Adolf Eichmann. 96 Ben Gurion expressed confidence that the
Argentinians would view this as an act of "historical justice" and that the
friendly relations between Israel and the Argentine Republic would "suffer
no harm. '97
As this note was in transit, Argentina submitted a letter to the Is-
raeli regime dated June 8, 1960.98 Argentina condemned the cataclysmic
crimes committed by Hitler and his henchmen which cost the lives of mil-
lions.99 The Argentinians noted that Israel had not clarified whether the vol-
unteers were acting on behalf of the Jewish State.100 Argentina nevertheless
claimed that Israel's express approval of the acts of the volunteers and in-
tent to place Eichmann on trial resulted in the imputation of legal responsi-
bility to the Jewish State.101 The Argentinians also reiterated their
disappointment that, although the volunteers disregarded established inter-
national procedures, Israel had failed to offer appropriate reparations for the
violation of Argentine sovereignty. 02
Argentina suggested that Israel's focus on the historical grievances
of the Jewish people had resulted in the Israelis overlooking the signifi-
93 See Letter Dated 7 June 1960 from Mr. Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, to
Mr. Frondizi, President of Argentina, reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp.,
Apr.-June 1960, at 32, U.N. Doc. S/4342.
94 See id. at 33.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/4334
(Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic addressed to
the Embassy of Israel at Buenos Aires on 8 June 1960). On the same day that
Taboada replied, the Argentinian Ambassador to Israel was instructed to return to
Buenos Aires. See PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 68.
99 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/4334
(1960).
100 See id. at 25.
101 See id.
102 See id.
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cance of the sovereignty and equality of States embodied in the United Na-
tions Charter.10 3 Argentina expressed the hope that Israel would make the
only appropriate reparation; the return of Eichmann and the punishment of
those responsible for violating Argentinian law. 104 Once Eichmann was re-
turned, Israel would be free to request his return in accordance with the
procedures prescribed under international law. 105 The Argentinians admon-
ished that a failure to follow this course would result in the invocation of
United Nations procedures to remedy Israel's breach of the obligation to
respect the sovereign equality of States. 10 6
Argentina expressed doubt whether Israel was authorized to prose-
cute Eichmann for genocide.107 Article VI of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide provided for territorial jurisdiction;
trial by a competent tribunal of the State in whose territory the act was
committed. 108
On June 13, 1960, Argentina requested an "urgent meeting" of the
United Nations Security Council to consider the violation of its sovereign
rights. 1°9 Argentina contended that in view of the failure of diplomatic ex-
changes between the two countries that the conflict was appropriately sub-
mitted to the United Nations Security Council under Article 34 of the
United Nations Charter on the grounds that Eichmann's abduction had cre-
103 See id. at 26.
104 See id.
105 See id.
l06 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. VI [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion] discussed in id. Article VI also provided for jurisdiction by such international
tribunal as may be created in the future. Id. Unsuccessful efforts were made to
orchestrate a Ben Gurion-Frondizi meeting. Additional initiatives were undertaken
in New York, where Israel's Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir was on a visit. On
June 14, 1960, the Uruguayan Ambassador to the U.N. Professor Enrique Rodri-
quez Fabregat, invited to his home Dr. Mario Amadeo, the Argentinian Ambassa-
dor to the U.N., Mrs. Golda Meir and Michael Comay, Israel's Ambassador to the
U.N. The matter was not resolved during this two hour meeting. The next day,
Argentina called for the convening of the United Nations Security Council. See
PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 70.
109 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 27, U.N. Doc. S/4336
(Letter dated 15 June 1960 from the representatives of Argentina to the President of
the Security Council).
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ated an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust which was incompatible with
the preservation of international peace. 110
Argentina reiterated that the illicit and clandestine transfer of Eich-
mann to Israel constituted a violation of Argentine sovereignty and required
reparations."' This right, according to Argentina, was not qualified by any
consideration, including Eichmann's catastrophic crimes." 2 A contrary
conclusion would pave the path for States to take the law into their own
hands and posed a dire danger to the preservation of global peace." 3
The next day, President Frondizi's reply to Ben Gurion's letter of
June 7, arrived in Israel. 114 This note, which was dated June 13, 1960, reit-
erated that while Argentina had demonstrated its opposition to genocide,
that the "very principles of international coexistence are likely to be im-
paired if the relations between States are not conducted according to juridi-
cal norms which are universally accepted." 5 President Frondizi expressed
hope that their two peoples would resume "friendly relations." 116
On June 21, Israel requested an invitation to participate in any Se-
curity Council debates. 117 It also challenged whether Article 34 provided a
basis for jurisdiction. 118 According to Israel, this Article authorized the Se-
curity Council to investigate any dispute or situation whose continuance
may endanger international peace and security. 119 Argentina, however,
somewhat ambiguously claimed that Israel's actions constituted a political
question which constituted a precedent dangerous to international peace and
110 See id. Article 34 provides that the Security Council may "investigate" any
dispute which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order
to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endan-
ger international peace and security. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any
situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security
Council or General Assembly. See id. art. 35(1).
11' See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 27, U.N. Doc. S/4336
(1960).
112 See id. at 28.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 71.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at 29, U.N. Doc. S/4341
(Letter dated 21 June 1960 from the representative of Israel to the President of the
Security Council).
118 See id.
119 See id.
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security and created an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust incompatible
with the preservation of international peace.120 Israel stressed that these alle-
gations were not sufficient to bring this complaint within the jurisdiction of
the Security Council and that the matter should be resolved through direct
negotiations between the parties. 12'
IV. THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE
The Security Council debate was a reprise of the on-going disagree-
ment between Argentina and Israel. 22 The Council, torn between the
Scylla of State sovereignty, and the Chabrydis of bringing Eichmann to jus-
tice, attempted to construct a compromise. 12 3
The Argentinian representative to the United Nations, Dr. Mario
Amadeo, argued that Israel's apology constituted an admission of the Jew-
ish State's responsibility for Eichmann's abduction. 124 He noted that Israel
ratified and had become an accessory to Eichmann's illegal abduction. 125
The clandestine circumstances certainly cast doubt on the contention that he
voluntarily consented to stand trial in Israel. 126 At any rate, Eichmann
lacked the legal standing to waive Argentinian sovereignty. 127 His iimigra-
tion status was an internal Argentinian affair and could not be invoked as a
defense by Israel. 128
Dr. Amadeo stressed that this was not a mere violation of sover-
eignty; it was an assertion of Israeli jurisdiction over an individual resident
in the territory of another State. 29 Acquiescence in such acts would result in
the rule of international law being replaced by the code of the jungle. 130 The
Argentinian representative stressed that his country was acting in defense of
international human rights;' 3' "in defending our rights, we are defending the
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See generally U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 865
(1960) U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868 mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 868 (1960).
123 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 866th mtg, at 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 866 (1960)
(Mr. Lodge, United States).
124 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 865 (1960).
125 See id.
126 See id. at 5-6.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 6.
129 See id. at 7.
130 See id.
131 See id.
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security of the millions of men and women who seek refuge from persecu-
tion in their native lands and make new homes abroad." 132 Dr. Amadeo
reiterated that Israel was obligated to punish its nationals and to make repa-
rations for the violation of Argentinian sovereignty irrespective of whether
Eichmann's abduction had been carried out by public officials or by private
volunteers. 133
Dr. Amadeo clarified that Argentina would accept a settlement
scheme that both redressed Argentina's injured rights and recognized the
imperative to bring Eichmann to the bar of justice.13 4 However, Argentina
could not accept that accused was being brought to trial as a direct result of
the violation of international law. 135 Dr. Amadeo stressed that although his
country was outraged by Eichmann's crimes that it would be "putting these
bitter memories to a bad use to invoke them in an attempt to palliate a
violation of the law."' 136
The two operative paragraphs of the Argentinian draft amendment
declared that acts such as those at issue "affect the sovereignty of a Member
State and therefore cause international friction" and "may, if repeated, en-
danger international peace and security."'1 37 Moreover, this amendment re-
132 Id. at 8.
133 See id. at 5.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 9.
137 U.N. Doc. S/4345 reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 10, U.N.
Doc. S/P.V. 866 (1960). The prefatory paragraphs declared that the violation of
sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible with the United Nations Charter;
that respect for sovereign rights are essential to the harmonious coexistence of
States; that a repetition of acts such as those under discussion would create an
atmosphere of distrust and insecurity which are incompatible with international
peace; and that the resolution should not be interpreted as condoning the "odious
[sic] crimes of which Eichmann is accused." Id. Dr. Amadeo dismissed questions
concerning the jurisdiction of the Security Council. He contended that a situation
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace or security was not lim-
ited to an imminent danger of a generalized military conflict. See id. at 6. Interna-
tional peace and security were endangered in the event that a situation of hostility
may arise between two States which is likely to seriously affect the relations be-
tween them, even when the two are widely separated geographically and are only
modest military powers. See id. at 6-7. Argentina took the position that it was not
obligated to provide an interpretation of the phrase "appropriate reparations" and
that this would be a matter to be negotiated between the parties concerned in accor-
dance with international law. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., 868th mtg., at 9, U.N.
S/P.V. 868 (1960).
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quested that Israel make "appropriate reparations in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law. '138
Mr. Claude Corea of Ceylon, in support of Argentina, argued that
the violation of a fundamental rule of international law could not be counte-
nanced on the basis of vague claims such as "'historical justice"' and "'irre-
sistible inner force.""' 139 This was a slippery slope which inevitably would
result in States offering other equally ambiguous justifications for interven-
tion, including threats to their vital interests or internal security. 140 Mr.
Corea stressed that the sanctity of sovereignty was particularly important to
small nations, such as Ceylon and Israel, which found that this provided the
"surest shield" and "strongest sword" to safeguard their territorial
integrity. 141
In rebuttal, the Israeli United National delegate, Mrs. Golda Meier,
noted that Israel's "isolated" act must be viewed as "exceptional" and
"unique."'142 Those involved were motivated by a desire to bring to trial one
of the central cogs in the unprecedented annihilation of six million Jews,
three million of whom were children, and six million Slavs, mostly Poles
and Russians. 143 Mrs. Meier stressed that the survivors of the Holocaust
were concentrated within Israel and that these individuals existed within a
"nightmare of recollection" of those led to the crematorium, of "babies
thrown into the air" and employed as "targets for Nazi bullets," and of
mothers utilized as a human laboratory for "scientific experiments." 144
Eichmann's activities resulted in the destruction of the future foundation of
the Jewish State, depriving the country of essential intellect, inspiration and
ingenuity. 145
Eichmann was a major motor in the monstrous and malevolent ma-
chine that fueled the sadistic solution of the so-called Jewish question in
Germany and throughout the subjugated States of Europe. 146 Mrs. Meier
noted that Eichmann exercised freedom for fifteen years following the de-
138 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 865 (1960).
139 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 868 (1960).
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 866th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 866 (1960). Mrs.
Meir challenged the jurisdiction of the Security Council in light of the fact that
Argentina refused to meet with representatives of Israel and that Israel issued an
apology. See id. at 1.
143 See id. at 4-5.
144 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 866th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 866 (1960).
145 See id.
14 See id. at 7.
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feat of Nazi Germany. 47 She queried whether this was not "a violation of
the sovereignty of the spirit of man and of humanity's conception of
justice?"148
Despite the fact that Argentinian sovereignty had been violated by
private individuals, the Israelis had twice expressed their regret.149 While
individuals may have violated legal standards, they did so in pursuit of
Adolf Eichmann, an individual who would not have been admitted into Ar-
gentina or granted asylum had his true identity been revealed. 50 According
to Mrs. Meier, this abduction did not constitute a precedent since "modem
history knows of no such monster as Adolf Eichmann."' 151 Nor was this the
rule of the mob; Eichmann was seized and was to be subjected to due pro-
cess procedures. 152 Weighing the equities, Mrs. Meier insisted that Israel's
expressions of regret constituted appropriate reparation. ' 3
The Israeli representative questioned whether Eichmann's alleged
abduction fell within the Security Council's jurisdiction over threats to the
peace. 54 Was peace threatened by Eichmann apprehension and trial by the
very people to whose total physical annihilation he had dedicated all his
energies? 155 In fact, did not, "the [true] threat to peace lie in Eichmann at
large, Eichmann unpunished, Eichmann free to spread the poison of his
twisted soul to a new generation?"' 1 6 The Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics pointed out that the Allied Powers, during World War II, as well as the
United Nations, called for Nazi war criminals to be brought to the bar of
justice.' 57Argentina's failure to arrest and extradite Eichmann clearly
breached international policy, agreements and United Nations
resolutions.158
Henry Cabot Lodge, the American representative, recognized that
Eichmann had compiled a record of savagery that was unequaled in the
147 See id. at 8.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 9.
150 See id.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 9-10.
153 See id. at 10.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 See id. at 11-12.
158 See id. at 12. The debate became enmeshed in the Cold War with the Soviet
Union alleging that the West German government was dominated by former Nazi
officials. See id. at 12-13.
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twentieth century. 159 At the same time, the United States was rightfully con-
cerned with preserving and protecting State sovereignty.1 60 Mr. Lodge prof-
fered two amendments which were intended to insure that the Argentinian
resolution recognized and balanced the interests of the Parties and reflected
a conciliatory tone. 161 A preambular paragraph noted that Member States
were mindful of the universal condemnation of the Nazi's persecution of
the Jews and that the peoples of the world were concerned that Eichmann
should be brought to "appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is ac-
cused." 162 A new operative paragraph expressed the hope that the "tradition-
ally friendly relations" between Israel and Argentina would be
"advanced." 163 These modifications were accepted by Argentina without
reservation. 164 The United States expressed the view that appropriate repa-
rations had been made by the Security Council's passage of the resolution
together with the statement of the Israeli Prime Minister apologizing on
behalf of the Israeli government.1 65
V. THE POST-SECURITY COUNCIL NEGOTIATION
On June 28, Argentina requested that Israel respond to the note of
June 8 in light of the Security Council debate and resolution. 166 Israel, on
July 4, reiterated its apology and noted that its previous expressions of re-
gret constituted adequate reparation. 167 The Israelis pointed out that the
159 See id. at 14.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 15.
163 Id.
164 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg., at 9, S/P.V. 868 (1960).
165 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 867th mtg., at 1-2, S/P.V. 867 (1960). The resolu-
tion provided in the three operative paragraphs that the Security Council:
1. Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which af-
fect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause inter-
national friction, may, if repeated, endanger international peace
and security.
2. Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate repara-
tion in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
rules of international law.
3. Expresses the hope that the traditionally friendly relations be-
tween Argentina and Israel will be advanced.
See 15 S.C.R. S/4349 (June 24, 1960) (Supp April-June, 1960) at 35, S/4349.
166 See PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 76.
167 See id. at 77.
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American, British and French representatives to the Security Council voted
for the Security Council resolution on the understanding that text consti-
tuted adequate compensation. 168
The Argentinian Foreign Minister transmitted a note to the Israeli
Ambassador to Argentinia, on July 20, declaring that Argentina viewed
Israel's expressions of regret as inadequate reparations. 169 The Minister ad-
ded that his government reserved the right to take whatever action was ap-
propriate. 170 Two days later, Argentina expelled Israeli Ambassador Aryeh
Levavi; a decision which was softened by affirming a continuance of diplo-
matic relations and welcoming the visit of Shabtai Rosenne, the Legal Ad-
visor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry. 171 On August 3, a joint communique
was simultaneously issued in Buenos Aires and in Jerusalem, following a
series of meetings. 172 This declared that the two governments agreed to re-
gard as "closed the incident that arose out of the action taken by the Israel
nations which infringed fundamental rights of the State of Argentina" and
expressed the hope that the "traditionally friendly relations between the two
countries will be advanced." 173 Two months later Israel named a new Am-
bassador to Argentina.1 74
VI. THlE POLITICS OF PROSECUTION
The Holocaust had remained of secondary significance in a
fledgling Israeli State preoccupied with nation-building and with combating
the surrounding Arab States.175 The prosecution of Adolf Eichmann pro-
vided an opportunity to restore this tear in the fabric of Jewish history and
to firmly imprint on the minds of young Israelis that millions of their breth-
ren had been killed in Europe because they were Jews. 176 It was hoped that
young Israeli Sabras (individuals born in Israel) would develop an apprecia-
168 See id.
169 See id. at 78.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 79.
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 See IDITH ZERTAL, FROM CATASTROPHE TO POWER HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS
AND THE EMERGENCE OF ISRAEL 216-222 (1998). See also TiM COLE, SELLING THE
HOLOCAUST FROM AuscHwrrZ TO SCHINDLER: How HISTORY IS BOUGHT, PACK-
AGED, AND SOLD 63, 67 (1999); SHABTAI TEVETH, BEN-GURION AND THE HOLO-
CAUST (1996).
176 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 9.
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tion and respect for their Ashkenazi (Eastern European) elders. 177 The Al-
lied Powers at Nuremberg focused on the wars of aggression waged by the
Hitlerite regime'78 and Israel seized the opportunity to insure that history
recorded the horrors visited upon the Jewish people. 179 There also was a
wider audience; the peoples of the globe would learn the consequences of
their silence in the midst of the murder of millions.' 80 The lesson should be
learned that acceptance or accommodation to totalitarianism, racism or anti-
semitism could lead to the gas chamber. 8'
The abduction and trial of Eichmann thus presented opportunity to
assert Israeli strength and status on the world stage.182 This would serve as a
testimony to the essential role of the Jewish State in safeguarding and
shielding semites against a hostile world.183 Jews would never again be led
meekly to massacre; this was a strong message to Israel's Arab adversaries,
some of who had supported the Nazi cause. 184 The Israelis also utilized the
177 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 10. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion utilized the pros-
ecution to communicate that, despite negotiations with Germany over reparations
and arms sales, his political party, the Mapai, remained sensitive to the suffering of
the Holocaust. There also was a desire to find an issue to unite the Sephardic
immigrants of Asia and Africa and the Western European, Ashkenazic, establish-
ment who were the main backers of Mapai. See ToM SEGEV, THE SEVEN MILLION:
THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 328 (1993). Ben-Gurion also was eager to
divert attention from the potentially embarrassing revelation that Israel Kastner,
press spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in his capacity as
head of a Rescue Committee for Hungarian Jewry had collaborated with the Nazi
occupiers in Hungary. See id. at 257. A libel suit resulted in a court finding that
Kastner collaborated with the Germans and facilitated the deportation of Hungarian
Jews. In return, members of his family, inhabitants of his village and community
notables were permitted to emigrate. The judgment also determined that Kastner
persuaded two Israeli paratroopers secreted into Budapest to surrender to the
Germans in order to safeguard the Jewish community against possible retaliation.
Kastner was exonerated of the allegation that he shared in the division of Jewish
valuables. See id. at 282-283. The Israeli Supreme Court reversed the verdict, find-
ing that Kastner worked in good faith to rescue Hungarian Jews. See id. at 305-308.
The judgment was issued too late for Kastner; he had been assassinated several
months earlier. See id. at 308.
178 See COLE, supra note 175, at 66.
179 See SEGEV, supra note 177, at 329.
180 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 9-10.
181 See id. at 10.
182 See id. at 11.
183 See SEGEV, supra note 177, at 328-329.
184 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 13.
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Eichmann trial to claim a new singular status, claiming jurisdiction by vir-
tue of her self-proclaimed status as the Jewish national home; a safe-haven
in which the Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust likely would have sought
refuge.185
The Eichmann trial had a profound impact on West Germany,
which initiated the first serious steps to bring those implicated in the Nazi
mass murder to trial.186 However, this only skimmed the surface. For in-
stance, it was estimated that 5,000 of the 11,500 judges in the West German
Republic had been active in the judiciary under the Hitler regime.1 87 Dr.
Hans Globke, one of Chancellor Conrad Adenauer's closest advisers, was
revealed to be co-author of an interpretative commentary on the radically
racist Nuremberg Laws and was found to have been responsible for requir-
ing German Jews to adopt "Israel" or "Sarah" as a middle name.188 Fritz
Bauer, the Jewish Attorney General of Hesse, unsuccessfully applied to the
federal government in Bonn to initiate extradition proceedings against Eich-
mann. 89 Bonn rationalized that there was no extant extradition treaty be-
tween Israel and Germany and that Germany was unable to mete out the
proper punishment absent a provision for capital punishment. 190
The prosecution of Eichmann extended beyond his individual guilt.
This was nothing less than a primer on the pernicious plague of anti-semi-
tism in Nazi Germany and throughout history.19'
185 See SEGEV, supra note 177, at 330.
186 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 14. Four months prior to the Eichmann trial
Richard Baer, successor to Rudolf Hoss as Commandant of Auschwitz, was ar-
rested. Id. A number of Eichmann's underlings, including his representatives in
Rumania and Amsterdam, soon also were detained. Id. Other former high-ranking
Nazis also were arrested including Wilhelm Koppe, the director of a chocolate fac-
tory, who formerly was charged with cleansing Poland of Jews. See id. at 15. Mar-
tin Fellenz, the former Higher S.S. and Police Leader, a prominent member of the
Free Democratic Party in Konrad Adenauer's democratized Germany, was arrested
in June 1960 and charged with participation in and partial responsibility for the
murder of forty thousand Jews in Poland. The prosecutor demanded a life sentence
at hard labor; the court sentenced Fellenz to four years, two and half years of which
he had already served while waiting in jail to be tried. This skimmed the surface of
former Nazi war criminals residing in West Germany. See id. at 16.
187 See id.
188 Id. at 18-19.
189 See id. at 17.
190 See id. The absence of an extradition treaty merely meant that Israel or Ger-
many would not have been legally obligated to extradite Eichmann for trial. Id.
191 See id. at 19. Historian Peter Novick argues that the Eichmann trial was the first
coherent rendition of the Nazi barbarities presented to the American public and,
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VII. THE INDICTMENT
A. Statutory Scheme
Eichmann was prosecuted under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Act, 1950.192 In its 1953 decision in Honigman v. Attorney
General, the Israeli Supreme Court observed that the Act was intended to
provide a fair trial for alleged Nazi war criminals and their collaborators
charged with the brutalization and extermination of the Jewish people.
193
The Supreme Court noted that the law was fundamentally different from
other statutes in that it was retroactive, extraterritorial and authorized the
deviation from the laws of evidence and the imposition of capital punish-
ment and provided that prosecutions were not barred by the fact that the
accused had been previously tried abroad.194 The Supreme Court noted that
the circumstances under which the Nazi crimes were committed were ex-
traordinary" and that the enforcement of the rule of law under these condi-
tions required a statutory scheme which itself was "extraordinary. "195
Article One of the Act provided that an individual may be liable for
the death penalty who was convicted of a crime against the Jewish peo-
ple, 196 crime against humanity197 or war crime.198 These delicts were punish-
able when committed "during the period of the Nazi regime, in any enemy
that as a result of the trial that the term Holocaust became identified with the mur-
der of European Jewry. See PETER NOVICK, T-E HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE
133 (1999).
192 See Nazis And Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act, 1950, Reshumot, Sefer ha
Hukkim No. 57 (Aug. 9, 1950) at 251 reprinted in 1950 U.N.Y.B. HUM. RTS. 163
(1952) [hereinafter Nazi Collaborators Act].
193 See Honigan v. Attorney-General (Sup. Ct. Israel 1953) quoted in Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., Enforcement of the Laws of War, 18 I.L.R. 538, 543 (1957).
194 See id.
195 Id. The Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the act was to permit the just
and equitable prosecution of Nazi and Nazi collaborators involved in the extermi-
nation of Jews. The Act was not a rehabilitative measure. See id.
196 See Nazi Collaborators Act, supra note 192, art. l(a)(1). A crime against the
Jewish people required the commission of various enumerated acts with the intent
to destroy the Jewish people in whole or in part. This included killing Jews; causing
serious bodily or mental harm to Jews; placing Jews in living conditions calculated
to bring about their physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent
births among Jews; forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or re-
ligious group; destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets of value;
inciting to hatred against Jews. Other than the destruction of cultural assets, this
definition is based on the 1948 Genocide Convention. Id. art. 1(b). See Genocide
Convention supra note 108, art. 2.
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country." 199 The Statute also provided for jurisdiction over various criminal
acts committed against a "persecuted person." 200
197 See Nazi Collaborators Act, supra note 192, art. l(a)(2). Crimes against human-
ity are defined as murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial,
religious or political groups. Id. art. l(b). This differs from the Nuremberg stan-
dard, which required that a crime against humanity be committed in execution or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
198 See Nazi Collaborators Act, supra note 192, art. l(b). War crimes are defined as
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civil-
ian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or persons on the high seas; killing of hostages; plunder of public or private
property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; and devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity. Id. art. 1(b). The Nuremberg standard appears slightly
broader reciting that war crimes encompasses violations of the laws or customs of
war and that such violations shall include, but shall not be limited to the various
enumerated acts. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 197, art. 6(b).
199 Nazi Collaborators Act, supra note 192, art. l(a)(1). A persecuted person means
a person belonging to a national, racial, religious or political group which was
persecuted by an enemy administration. Id. art. 16. The period of the Nazi regime
encompassed January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945. Id. The latter was distinguished
from the Nuremberg standard which limited the jurisdiction of the International
Military Tribunal to crimes against peace and acts associated with aggressive wars.
This effectively restricted the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes to the period following the initiation of an aggressive war
against Poland in 1939. See United States v. Joseph Goering et. al. XII Trial of the
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 411, 498 (1948)
[hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]. The Nuremberg judgment did not directly ad-
dress the issue of genocide. See also Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARiz.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 425-430 (1998).
200 Nazi Collaborators Act, supra note 192, art. 2. Enemy administration is defined
as the administration that existed in an enemy country. Id. art. 16. Enemy country
means Germany during the period of the Nazi regime as well as any other Axis
State during the period of the war or any territory under the effective control of
Germany or another Axis State. Id. Article Two punished an individual who com-
mitted an enumerated criminal act against a persecuted person, "as a persecuted
person," in an enemy country; the perpetrator shall be liable to the same punish-
ment as that which he would have been subject had he committed the act in Israeli
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Article Eight abrogated the traditional criminal defenses of con-
straint, necessity, justification and the exercise of judicial function in the
case of prosecutions under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
Act.20 ' These considerations might be taken into account in mitigation of
punishment.202
Article Nine provided that an individual who committed an offense
under the Act may be prosecuted in Israel despite that the fact that he or she
had been tried for the same offense abroad, whether before a domestic or
territory. Article Two arguably extended pre-existing provisions of Israeli law
based on a claim of jurisdiction over the victim. The application of existing legal
standards seemed designed to rebut claims of retroactive application of the law. See
id. art. 2. Article 4 utilized a similar scheme to impose liability on individuals who
committed a criminal act against a persecuted person while exercising some func-
tion in a place of confinement on behalf of an enemy administration. Id. art. 4.
Article 3 imposed liability for knowing membership in an organization declared
criminal pursuant to Article 9 of the Nuremberg Charter. See id. art. 3. Article Five
punished by ten years a person who during the Nazi regime was instrumental in
turning a persecuted person over to the enemy administration. Id. art. 5. Article Six
imposed imprisonment not exceeding seven years on an individual who demanded
or received a benefit from a persecuted person under threat of delivering him or her
or another persecuted person to any enemy administration, Id. art. 6(a); or de-
manded or received a benefit from a person who had provided shelter to a perse-
cuted person under threat of delivering him or her or the sheltered persecuted
person to an enemy administration. Id. art. 6(b).
201 See Nazi Collaborators Act, supra note 192, art.8. These defenses were set forth
in sections 16-19 of the Israeli Criminal Code. Id. Article Ten provided that a
persecuted person may invoke the defense that he or she committed a criminal act
to avert immediate death and did his or her best to avert the consequences of the act
or omission. Id. art. 10(a). A persecuted person also may invoke the defense that
he or she committed or omitted to perform the act with the intent to avert conse-
quences more serious than those which resulted from the act or omission, and actu-
ally averted the harm. Id. art. 10(a). These defenses were not available in the case
of crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and mur-
der. Id. art. 10.
202 See id. art. 11. The grounds for mitigation included that a crime was committed
under conditions which would otherwise exempt the accused from liability or con-
stituted a reason for pardon and that the accused took steps to reduce the gravity of
the consequences of the offense. Id. art. 11 (a). The offense also might be mitigated
when committed with the intent to avert more severe consequences than resulted
from the offense. Id. art. 11(b). In the case of a crime against the Jewish people,
crime against humanity and war crime, a defendant's sentence may not be miti-
gated to a term of imprisonment for less than ten years. Id. art. 11.
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international court.203 An Israeli court, in affixing punishment, was to con-
sider any sentence served abroad.204 Article Twelve established a twenty
year statute of limitations for all offenses other than crimes against the Jew-
ish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and murder. 2 5 A court was
authorized to deviate from the rules of evidence in any prosecution in the
event that the tribunal was satisfied that this would "promote the ascertain-
ment of the truth and the just handling of the case. 2 °6.
B. Indictment
Adolf Eichmann was indicted on fifteen counts under the Nazis and
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act.207 Counts One through Four charged
Eichmann with crimes against the Jewish people.208 Count One detailed
Eichmann's involvement in the "killing of millions of Jews" through his
coordination of the ghettoization, deportation and extermination of the Jews
of Germany, the other Axis and occupied countries.20 9 This included Jews
deported to concentration camps as well as Jews deported to Minsk and
Riga, where they were systematically slaughtered by killing squads.210
Count Two charged the creation of physical conditions calculated to bring
about the physical destruction of Jews, including forced labor, ghettoization
and mass deportation under inhumane conditions. 2 1 Count Three accused
Eichmann of causing serious harm through the enslavement, starvation, de-
portation, persecution and detention of Jews in conditions designed to cause
their degradation and the deprivation of their rights and inhumane suffering
and torture.212 Eichmann was charged in Count Four with the prevention of
childbearing among the Jews of Germany and countries occupied by the
203 See id. art. 9(a).
204 See id. art. 9(b).
205 See id. art. 12(b). Amnesties are not available for offenses under the act. Id. art.
13.
206 Id. art. 15(a). The court shall place on the record the reasons for deviating from
the rules of evidence. Id. art. 15(b). A prosecution may be instituted only by the
Attorney-General. Id. art. 14.
207 See Attorney-General v. Adolf Eichmann (Indictment) reprinted in PAPADATOS,
supra note 10, at 111.
208 See id. at 111-117.
209 Id. at 111.
210 See id. at 112-115 and accompanying texts.
211 See id. at 115.
212 See id. at 115-116.
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Reich. 213 This included providing the offspring of mixed marriages the al-
ternative of sterilization or deportation.214
Counts Five through Seven charged Eichmann with crimes against
humanity directed against Jews. 215 Count Seven introduced the charge of
spoliation of the property of millions of Jews resident in Germany and oc-
cupied countries by means of the inhumane measures of compulsion, theft,
terrorism and torture.216 Counts Nine through Twelve charged Eichmann
with crimes against humanity directed against Poles, Yugoslavs, Gypsies
and Czechoslovaks. 217 Count Twelve was particularly poignant, alleging
that, in 1942, Eichmann was involved in the deportation and execution of
approximately one hundred children from the village of Lidice in Czecho-
slovakia.218 Counts Thirteen through Fifteen charged Eichmann with mem-
bership in hostile, criminal organizations, 219 including service as Director of
the Department for Jewish Affairs in the Gestapo. 220
C. Eichmann's Preliminary Defense: In His Own Words
Eichmann responded to the indictment by repeating fifteen times
the incantation invoked by the defendants at Nuremberg: "In the sense of
the indictment-not guilty."22'
In 1960, Life Magazine published the transcript of an interview be-
tween journalist Willen Sassen and Adolf Eichmann. 222 Eichmann antici-
pated the defense he was to later offer at trial, contending that he was
"merely a little cog in the machinery that carried out the directives of the
213 See id. at 116.
214 See id. at 117.
215 See id. at 117-120.
216 See id. at 118. This included compulsory payment to finance deportations, the
seizure of property and the removal of personal effects and gold teeth, hair and
other body parts from victims. Id. at 119-120. Count Seven recorded that personal
effects and valuables seized from internees at Auschwitz were stored in thirty-five
warehouses. Id. at 120.
217 See id. at 121-122.
218 See id. at 122. This was undertaken in retribution for the assassination of Rein-
hard Heydrich in Prague. Id.
219 See id. at 123-124.
220 See id. at 123-124 (Count Fifteen).
221 HAUSNBR, supra note 75, at 323.
222 Eichmann Tells His Own Damning Story, LIFE, Nov. 28, 1960, at 19, at http://
www2.ca.nizkor.org./-kewis/trials/profiles/introducton.html.
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German Reich. ' 223 Eichmann conceded that the Jews would not have died
had he not transported them to the camps.2 24 At the same time, Eichmann
avowed that "[i]t would be as pointless to blame me for the whole Final
Solution of the Jewish Problem as to blame the official in charge of the
railroads over which the Jewish transports traveled. '225 An order issued by
the Hitlerite regime was to be obeyed; a failure to follow orders would have
implicated Eichmann not only as a "scoundrel but a despicable pig."226
Still, Eichmann pointed out that the majority of Jews were not ex-
terminated and were deployed in factories and in munitions plants. 227 In
fact, he noted that there are "thousands of Jews happily alive today" who
were interned in the camps.228 The notion that Jews were systematically
cleansed from Europe was mistaken: it was "child's play for a Jew to reach
relative safety" and thousands remained resident in ghettos at the conclu-
sion of the conflict or managed to avoid apprehension. 229 Eichmann con-
tended that the Final Solution was not a battle fought with implements of
death and destruction. 230 He claimed that the Nazis primarily relied on
"spiritual methods" and condemned physical liquidation as a "vulgar,
coarse action. '231 Eichmann insisted that he did not dislike or despise Jews
and respected and endorsed their aspirations. 232 In fact, had be been a Jew
he claimed that he would have been "the most ardent Zionist
imaginable."2 33
Following his apprehension in 1961, Eichmann was subjected to
interrogation by Israeli police captain Avner Less. 234 During these sessions,
he reiterated the theme that he was a mere transportation expert who disin-
223 I Transported Them... To The Butcher, LIFE, Nov. 28, 1960, at 21, at http://
www.2.ca.nizkor.org/-kewis/trials/profiles/eichmannintro.html.
224 See id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See id. at 109-110, at http://www2.ca.nizkor.org/-kewis/trials/profiles/
shipments.html
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See id.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 21-22, at http://www2.ca.nizkor.org/-kewis/trials/profiles/
annihilation.html.
233 Id.
234 See EICHMANN INTERROGATED TRANSCRIPTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE IS-
RAELI POLICE (Jochen von Lang in collaboration with Claus Sibyll trans., Ralph
Manheim trans.)[hereinafter EICHMANN INTERROGATED]. Portions of Eichmann's
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terestedly obeyed orders. 235 Eichmann claimed ignorance; he alleged that he
had neither read Hitler's seminal statement, Mein Kampf in its entirety, 236
nor other Nazi tracts,237 could not recall the party program,238 and knew
nothing about Zyklon B gas239 or the liquidation of Jews by killing
squads.240 Furthermore, he stated that he saw the chimneys of the cremato-
rium at Auschwitz, but "didn't watch the gassing. '241 He said, "I couldn't.
I'd have probably keeled over. '242 The burning of corpses was "as much as
I could stand. I wasn't up to it."243 Eichmann continued to insist that he was
a transport expert2" and that he was neither involved in drawing up lists of
evacuees245 nor in planning or directing the killing of Jews 246 and was not
kept informed of the fate of the Jews in the camps.247 He insisted that "pure
transportation" has "nothing to do with killing" and that this constituted a
"big distinction. '248 Eichmann reiterated that "I never killed a Jew .... I've
never killed anybody. And I never ordered anybody to kill a Jew, or ordered
anybody to kill a non-Jew. No, never." 24 9 Queried about the extermination
of Jewish children, Eichmann stressed that "I don't know. I've told you
repeatedly, that wasn't in my jurisdiction. 250
Eichmann reiterated that he was "neither a Jew-hater nor an anti-
Semite" and "never had any trouble with the Jewish functionaries. '251 He
merely followed orders and stated that he would have adhered to commands
to kill his own father without hesitation.252 Eichmann was not positioned to
statement were played in court and the transcript was introduced into evidence. See
HAUSNER, supra note 75, at 325.
235 See EicHlvANN INTERROGATED, supra note 234, at 131.
236 See id. at 36.
237 See id. at 37.
238 See id.
239 See id. at 85.
240 See id. at 81.
241 Id at 83-84.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 85.
244 See id. at 104, 131.
245 See id. at 108-109.
246 See id. at 104.
247 See id. at 109-111.
248 Id. at 131.
249 Id. at 101.
250 Id. at 277.
251 Id. at 149.
252 See id. at 157.
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adjudge the legality of orders. After all, "[wiho is a little man like me to
trouble his head about it? I get orders from my superior and I look neither
right nor left. That's not my job. My job is to obey and comply. '253 During
wartime, "[y]ou click your heels and say 'Yes sir.' That's all there was to
it."254
In summary, Eichmann carefully constructed himself as a faithful
functionary, refused to accept responsibility and did not defend or rational-
ize Nazi policies. The accused's rather passionless portrayal seemed to fit
the gray countenance of the balding, be-speckled defendant in the glass en-
closed booth. This was the ultimate denigration, since Jews had been exter-
minated for no reason other than that Eichmann believed that he was
obligated to obey superior orders. He indifferently viewed the Jews as
building blocks in the edifice of his career. Eichmann refused to accept
responsibility for his actions and denied that his deportation of Jews impli-
cated him in mass murder.255
VIII. THE EICHMANN TRIAL
A. The Prosecutor's Opening Argument
Prosecutor Gideon Hausner's opening address set the stage for the
trial.256 He invoked the prophetic call of the "judges of Israel" and pro-
claimed that he represented "six million accusers" who were unable to "rise
to their feet to point an accusing finger toward the glass booth and cry out at
the man sitting there, 'I accuse.' ' 257 Hausner stressed that the Holocaust
was a significant chapter in the history of Jewish suffering. 258 The Pharaoh
in Egypt, "tortured and oppressed them [the Jews] and threw their sons into
253 Id. at 158.
254 Id. at 271.
255 See SEGEV, supra note 177, at 345. Segev recorded that prosecutor Gideon
Hausner wrote that Eichmann possessed "hands like talons." Segev observed that
the glass booth "contained only a bland and balding man in a suit and eyeglasses,
with a nervous tic at the comer of his mouth, leafing endlessly through the stacks of
documents in front of him." Id.
256 See id. at 346-347. Hausner's speech was reviewed by Israeli Prime Minister
David Ben-Gurion who suggested modifications designed to protect West Ger-
many's image and to avoid the contention that the German people were collectively
responsible. Ben-Gurion urged Hausner to attribute primary responsibility to Adolf
Hitler. The Prime Minister also suggested omitting the argument that Nazism was
inevitable in anticipation that this would spark a debate over German character and
history. The opening address lasted eight hours. Id.
257 Id. at 347.
258 See id.
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the river. '2 59 Hainan [in Persia] ordered them "destroyed, murdered, and
obliterated."2 60 Chmielnicki [Ukraine] "slaughtered them in masses;"
Petlura [Poland] "launched pogroms against them."'26' But, none of these
individuals had matched the Nazis in so efficiently and effectively setting
their sites on the extermination of the Jewish people;262 this was an unprece-
dented tale of total technological murder.2 63 The killing field was centered
in Europe, "the heart of the [Jewish] nation, the source of its vitality" and
progenitor of modem Jewish secular and religious thought and the home of
the founders of the State of Israel. 264 Hausner bolstered the Israeli's juris-
dictional claim by noting that those who died had been deprived of their
dream to emigrate to a Zionist State.265
Hausner noted that the Eichmann trial was not the first to adjudicate
the guilt of Nazi war criminals, but that this prosecution was unique in
placing the fate of the Jewish people at the center of concern. 266 Eichmann
was the official who had been entirely concerned and consumed with the
destruction of the Jews. 267 He viewed the "destruction of the Jews" as his
"destiny and calling. '268 The accused was complicit in these crimes and his
guilt was equal to those who sealed the Jews in the gas chambers.269
In Eichmann, the people of the planet "encounter a new kind of
killer, the kind that exercises his bloody craft behind a desk, and only occa-
sionally does the deed with his own hands. '270 He exercised authority over
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 See id. "Even the most bloodcurdling and grisly male factions of Nero, Attila,
and Genghis Khan-archetypes of barbarity and blood lust, watchwords of evil and
infamy-pale beside the atrocities and terrors of the destruction that will be de-
scribed in this court." Id.
263 See PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 150.
264 See SEGEV, supra note 177, at 349.
265 See id.
266 See PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 150.
267 See id.
268 Id. Hausner expressed doubt whether the trial would succeed in revealing the
roots of evil and left this task to the academic and professional experts on human
behavior. See id. at 150-151.
269 See id. at 149. The guilt of Germany was shared by other European States. See
id. at 154-155.
270 Id.
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the fate of the Jews and his signature "sealed the doom of tens of
thousands." 271
Hausner described Eichmann's central role in the three phases of
Final Solution: the evacuation, territorial concentration, and extermination
of the Jews. 272 He had been designated by Reinhard Heydrich to orchestrate
the Final Solution 273 and had been responsible for "combing Europe" to
detain and to deport Jews; he "held the Jewish people in his grip like an
octopus strangling its prey. '274 The story and scope of the Final Solution
could be catalogued through Eichmann's activities: organizing and tracking
deportations and delivering deportees; consulting on mechanisms of exter-
mination; negotiating with the heads of satellite governments; inspecting
ghettos and concentration camps, observing mass executions, and dis-
missing entreaties to save individual Jews.2 75
Gideon Hausner concluded by proclaiming that the history of the
Final Solution now will be written by the "kinsmen of the corpses" in the
courtroom of Jerusalem with Adolf Eichmann "in the dock. '276 In this pro-
cess, Hausner observed that Eichmann would be accorded a trial, a privilege
that he was unwilling to accord to his victims. 277
B. The Evidence At Trial
The prosecution challenged the contention that Eichmann was a
dispassionate bureaucrat and transportation expert. 278 The declaration of
271 Id. Eichmann was emblematic of the intelligentsia and professionals who were
complicit in the Nazi crimes. Id. Hausner noted that strong figures had sought
power in many countries. But it was only in Germany that the seed of Nazism had
found a fertile soil in Germany. Id. at 151.
272 See id. at 166.
273 See id. at 176-177.
274 Id. at 177-178.
275 See id. at 178-179.
276 Id. at 185.
277 See HAUSNER, supra note 75, at 325.
278 See The Attorney-General Of The Government Of Israel, Crim. Case. No. 40/
61 (Dist. Ct., 1961) [hereinafter Transcript]. The evidence presented by the prose-
cution involved oral and documentary evidence attesting to Eichmann's involve-
ment in the Final Solution in Germany and in each country occupied by the Third
Reich. PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 227. Eichmann was on the stand from June 20
to July 24, for a total of thirty-three and a half sessions. Sixty-two sessions, out of a
total of one hundred and twenty-one, were spent recording the testimony of one
hundred prosecution witnesses. The presentation of this testimony lasted from April
24 to June 12. ARENDT, supra note 80, at 223.
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Rudolf Hoss, the Commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, who
had been convicted and sentenced to death by a Polish court, characterized
Eichmann as an active, energetic and largely independent administrator. 279
Hoss first encountered Eichmann when the accused arrived at Auschwitz to
discuss the extermination of Jewry. 280 According to Hoss, Eichmann was
"wholly and compulsively obsessed with the Jewish Question and with the
"Final Solution. '281 The defendant was absolutely convinced that the eradi-
cation of the "biological foundation of the Jews in the East" would deal a
death blow to the future of world Jewry. 282 Hoss wrote that Eichmann
viewed the deployment of Jews in work brigades as unnecessarily impeding
the extermination of Jewry, a goal which seemed increasingly unlikely to be
achieved as Germany's hopes of total victory faded. 28 3 Still, Eichmann re-
fused to concede that the aspirations of the Nazi super-State would not be
accomplished, and invoked his superior orders as a justification for acceler-
ating the pace of deportations. 284 According to Hoss, Eichmann refused to
countenance delay and frequently sent transports to Auschwitz that ex-
ceeded the agreed upon quota.285 Hoss concluded that his distinct impres-
sion was that the "Final Solution" was Eichmann's "life mission. 286
The prosecution's initial witness, Professor Solo Baron of Colum-
bia University, documented the destruction of the Jewish communities of
Europe, which resulted from Eichmann's devout devotion and discipline. 287
Poland's Jewish community of 3,300,000 was reduced to 73,955.288 In Ger-
The District Court Tribunal was comprised of Moshe Landau, a member
of the Supreme Court, and two regular district court judges, Benjamin Halevi and
Dr. Yitzhak Raveh. All three judges emigrated to Palestine in 1933 when it was
under British Mandate. PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 95-96. Eichmann chose Dr.
Robert Servatius of the Cologne Bar as his attorney, who had considerable ex-
peience defending accused Nazi war criminals. The Knesset passed a special law
permitting Servatius to practice before Israel courts and the Israeli government paid
him 300,000 to represent Eichmann. The prosecuting attorney was Gideon
Hausner, Israeli Attorney General. HAUSNER, supra note 75, at 302-303.
279 See Transcript, supra note 278, at 241 (Sess. 16, Apr. 26, 1961).
280 See id. at 242.
281 Id. at 241.
282 See id. at 242.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 See id.
286 Id
287 See id. at 183 (Sess. 13, Apr. 24, 1961).
288 See id.
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many, 15-20,000 remained out of a thriving population of one half mil-
lion.289 Czechoslovakia's population numbered 117,551 Jews in 1930 and
now totaled 14,489; only 1,179 were children fifteen or younger.290 In Po-
land, prior to World War II there were vital Jewish communities in 2,000
cities.291 However, in 1945, Jews remained in only 224 communities. 292
The result was that the extermination of one-third of the world-wide
Jewish population and the corrosion of the center of Jewish culture, theol-
ogy, social and scientific thought.293 In 1939, there were 16,500,000 Jews in
the world; in 1961 there were 12,000,000.294 Absent the Holocaust, Baron
testified that the natural population increase would have resulted in a popu-
lation of 20,000,000.295 There was no precedent in Jewish history for such
widespread and all-embracing devastation which spanned global geogra-
phy.296 Eichmann's shadow loomed over the prosecution's documentary ev-
idence, which was powerfully supplemented by the personal accounts of
Holocaust survivors.2 97 The callous and cruel character of these crimes chal-
lenged Eichmann's distant and disinterested demeanor; the message was
that only a severe and sadistic figure could have presided over this con-
temptible campaign.298
A brief glimpse of Eichmann's determined demeanor was provided
in the testimony of Benno Cohen, a German lawyer and World War I vet-
eran, who headed the Zionist organization in Berlin.299 At a meeting in Ber-
lin in late 1938 or early 1939, Cohen testified that Eichmann accused
Jewish leaders of contacting their Viennese brethren in contravention of his
commands and warned that "[i]f such a thing occurs once more, you will go
to a Konzer-Lager (concentration camp)!"3 o Eichmann responded to the
defiant statement of one Jewish leader by threatening, "you miserable ras-
289 See id.
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See id. at 184.
295 See id.
296 See id. at 183.
297 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 220-224.
298 See infra notes 318-367 and accompanying texts.
299 See Transcript, supra note 278, at 210-211 (Sess. 15, Apr. 25, 1961).
300 Id. at 228. This is a vulgar term for Konzentrationslager or concentration camp.
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cal, you old shit-bag.... it seems it is a long time since you have been to a
camp. What do you think you are doing? How dare you complain?" 30 1
Eichmann later announced the establishment of a Berlin Emigration
Center similar to one he designed in Vienna, sketched the procedure to Jew-
ish leaders and informed them that they would be expected to satisfy emi-
gration quotas.302 The accused stressed that these evacuations would
proceed in an expeditious fashion: the "Jew goes in through the front door,
and goes out the back with all the papers in his hand. "303
Aharon Lindenstrauss, in charge of the Aliyah (emigration to Israel)
Department of the Palestine Office in Berlin, later accompanied several
Jewish leaders to a meeting with Eichmann in Austria.304 Eichmann insisted
that emigration from the Germany had to be accelerated, and shifted into
"high gear. '30 5 He demanded a "thousand passports everyday, that is the
minimum. '30 6 Eichmann refused to discuss the details and informed the
Jewish leaders that it was their problem as to how this was to be accom-
plished.307 He also noted that an emigration tax would be imposed, but dis-
missed the notion that these funds would be made available to the Jewish
community to finance the departure of Jews from Germany: "This is out of
the question! .. .How should we pay for keeping your old bags alive?" 308
Absent Eichmann's trial, the tales of those swept up in the deporta-
tions, gliettoization and concentration camps likely would have gone unre-
ported. Those who testified invariably survived through serendipity and the
folly of fortune. Leon Wells who, at the time of the trial was an engineer in
the United States, was the only survivor of a family of seventy-six from
Lvov, Poland.3°9 In explaining the source of his inner-strength to persevere,
Wells testified that "somebody had to remain to tell the world that it was
the idea of the Nazis to kill all the Jews-so we had a responsibility some-
how to withstand this idea and to be alive. '310 Ya'akov Biskowitz was in-
terned in Sobibor.31n Two Jewish inmates escaped and in retaliation an
301 Id.
302 See id. at 229.
303 Id.
304 See id. at 233-234 (Sess. 15, Apr. 25, 1961).
305 Id. at 234.
306 Id.
307 See id. at 235.
308 Id.
309 See id. at 360 (Sess. 22 May 1, 1961).
310 Id. at 369 (Sess. 23, May 2, 1961).
311 See id. at 1183 (Sess. 65, June 5, 1961).
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entire block of male inmates were marked for execution.312 They selected
every third individual, passed by Biskowitz, killing twenty.313 Alfred Op-
penheimer arrived at Auschwitz and immediately handed his watch over to
a Jewish Kapo who, in appreciation, told Oppenheimer to claim that he was
an experienced craftsman, five years younger than his actual age and that he
was in perfect health; he was selected for work while a companion who was
a ski champion identified himself as a lawyer and was sent to his death.314
Oppenheimer later volunteered to work as a mechanic at the Gleiwitz labor
camp. Along with a companion, he stole and was caught with potatoes. The
other inmate, who had stolen six or seven potatoes, had a rope placed on his
neck and was forcefully pulled up to the ceiling. As the rope was placed on
Oppenheimer's neck, the commander of the camp intervened and ordered
that a single potato only merited hanging him by the hands. 315 Aharaon
Beilin was found with an unauthorized piece of bread and only avoided a
fatal shot of petrol in the heart when a syringe was unable to be found.316
Rivka Yoselewska witnessed the killing of her father, mother, and eighty
year old grandmother, along with her two sisters, as well as other members
of her family.317 A German soldier then seized and shot her child. Next, he
shot Rivka in the head, causing her to fall underneath an avalanche of dying
and desperate humanity. 318 Miraculously, she survived, extracted herself
from the trench, hid from the Germans, joined Jews in the forest and was
rescued by the Soviets in 1944.319
The Jews throughout Europe were initially concentrated in central-
ized and self-contained ghettos. 320 Witness Doctor Mark Dworjecki de-
scribed the conditions in Vilna.32 1 The population lived on a subsistence
diet of 170 or 200 calories per day while being subjected to intense involun-
tary physical labor.322 The witness testified that, absent the food smuggled
into the ghetto, this diet would have resulted in the death through starvation
of the entire population within one or two months. 323 Under these condi-
312 See id. at 1185.
313 See id.
314 See id. at 1865 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961).
315 Id. at 1867.
316 See id. at 1266 (Sess. 69, June 7, 1961).
317 See id. at 516-517 (Sess. 20, May 8, 1961).
318 See id. at 517-518.
319 See id.
320 See id. at 450 (Sess. 27, May 4, 1961).
321 See id. at 450-451.
322 See id. 452.
323 See id.
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tions, a number of Jews were reduced to so-called "musselmen," who were
individuals existing in catatonic conditions, slowly and deliberately moving
about while wrapped in blankets and sheets.324 Moreover, the population
suffered from skin disease, tuberculosis, swollen limbs, the collapse of
veins and arteries, typhoid, internal organ damage and night-blindness.3 25
Additionally, witnesses recounted inexplicable acts of sadism. Shamuel
Horowitz testified that a deputy commander of the criminal police entered a
hospital, threw two children out a window, shot patients immobilized in bed
and ordered the remaining patients to lie face down on the floor and killed
them.326 As the population swelled in the Vilna ghetto, thousands were peri-
odically removed and exterminated. 327 Five thousand volunteered to be
transported from the Vilna to the Kovno ghetto and then were summarily
executed. 328
Several witnesses noted that the Nazis targeted children in the
ghetto.329 Witness Aharon Peretz recounted the so-called "children's action"
in the Kovno ghetto, in which children were swept off the street.330 He
recounted an incident in which three children were taken from their mother.
She demanded the return of her children and the solider responded, "[y]ou
can take one."'331 The children stretched out their arms and the mother, un-
willing to make a choice, retreated from the car .332 Another mother hung to
the car and only released her grip after being assaulted by an attack dog.
3 33
A third demanded the return of one of her two children; a soldier grasped
one of the young girls by the shoulders and threw her to the ground.
334
These descriptions of senseless and sadistic violence were implic-
itly contrasted with the due process procedures afforded to Adolf Eich-
mann. Germany's actions against the Jews, whatever the alleged
justification, could only be viewed as malevolent murder. Of course, a more
stringent court and active defense attorney might find that these personal
and largely uncorroborated accounts based on distant memory were irrele-
324 Id. at 453. This word was introduced by the Germans and seems to derive from
the Moslem practice of wrapping themselves in shawls while praying. Id.
325 See id.
326 See id. at 512 (Sess. 30, May 8, 1961).
327 See id. at 451 (Sess. 27, May 4, 1961) (witness Mark Dworzecki).
328 See id.
329 See id. at 470 (Sess. 28, May 4, 1961) (witness Avraham Karasik).
330 Id. at 479.
331 Id.
332 See id.
333 See id.
334 See id.
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vant to the case against the accused. There was the related issue as to how
to guard against prejudice in a prosecution that was based on such an inher-
ently inflammatory and cruel factual foundation. 335
The same evidentiary pattern was nevertheless followed as the
prosecution moved to the deportations to the concentration camps. In Sep-
tember 1942, 120,000 Jews were assembled in the Warsaw Ghetto and over
the course of the next week 60,000 were evacuated to the Treblinka death
camp. 336 A member of the Gestapo sat at a desk and sent the children, the
weak and the aged to their death.337 This action culminated on Yom Kippur,
the Jewish Day of Atonement, in 1942.338 Adolf Avrahm Berman, a psy-
chologist, described an earlier action in which the Nazis invaded schools,
orphanages and hospitals and sent the children and their teachers along with
nurses, psychologists and social workers to Treblinka. 339 Berman visited
Treblinka following the war and found a vast area of skulls, bones and piles
of children's shoes. 34° He announced at the trial that he had a pair of shoes
with him: "I brought it as a very precious thing, because I knew that over a
million of such little shoes, scattered over all the fields of death, could very
easily be found.."341 Dr. Martin Foeldi, a lawyer, was deported with his fam-
ily from Czechoslovakia to Auschwitz. 342 Men and boys arriving at the
camp were directed to the right; women and younger children to the left,
and ultimate death. 343 Foeldi was approached by a German soldier who in-
structed Foeldi's twelve year old son to join his mother and sister. Foeldi
testified that his daughter wore a red coat and "the red spot was the sign that
my wife was near there. The red spot was getting smaller and smaller. I
walked to the right and never saw them again."'344 The women selected for
work were instructed to hand their children over to a grandmother or older
women who then were diverted to the left and death.345 In their first few
days in the camp, inmates were provided with a pencil and paper and or-
335 See generally ARENDT, supra note 80, at 8-10.
336 See Transcript supra note 278, at 405-06 (Sess., 25, May 3, 1961) (witness
Zivia Lubetkin-Zuckerman).
337 See id. at 406.
338 See id.
339 See id. at 426-427 (Sess. 26, May 3, 1961).
340 See id. at 427.
341 Id.
342 See id. at 967-968 (Sess. 53, May 26, 1961).
343 See id.
344 Id.
345 See id.
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dered to write their relatives, ensuring them that they were working and
doing well in Austria. 346
Individuals selected for extermination were led to the gas chambers
that were labeled, constructed and equipped to resemble showers. 347 The
inmates dutifully placed their clothes on numbered hangars and were ad-
monished to act swiftly so that the percolating coffee would not become
cold 48 Inside the chambers were what appeared to be water valves.349 The
Zyklon-B gas was then inserted into the chamber and within thirty-five or
forty minutes the occupants were dead.350 The chamber was ventilated, the
bodies cleared, gold teeth and other valuables were extracted, and then the
bodies were burned.351 Witness Eliahu Rosenberg worked clearing corpses
from the ovens at Treblinka and testified that on one occasion all three
ovens were ignited and ten thousand people were exterminated within forty-
five minutes.352 He also noted that the children often hugged the floor and
managed to survive; they were then shot to death by the guards.353
Life inside the camps for individuals yoked to the wheel of labor
was nasty and harsh. Esther Goldstein testified that at Auschwitz one thou-
sand women were assigned to a bloc; twelve to a shelf in the barracks. 354
Food was served to all twelve in a single dish; there were no spoons or
forks and the inmates counted each sip of gruel in order to insure that the
rations were equally shared. 355 Witness Dr. Joseph Melkrman testified con-
cerning conditions in Bergen-Belsen and recounted an incident in which a
German soldier beat several women who were fighting over scraps of food
at the bottom of a barrel.356 He noted that one inmate documented fourteen
incidents of cannibalism. 357 Internees were disciplined through severe beat-
ings; neglect or absence from work resulted in death by hanging. 358 Con-
fronted with these conditions, Ya'akof Friedman testified that inmates
would run into the electrified fence surrounding the camp in order to com-
346 See id.
347 See id. at 1250 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961) (witness of Yehuda Bakon).
348 See id.
349 See id.
350 See id. at 1251.
351 See id.
352 See id. at 1215 (Sess. 66, June 6, 1961).
353 See id. at 1214.
354 See id. at 1283 (Sess. 70, June 8, 1961).
355 See id.
356 See id. at 618 (Sess. 34, May 5, 1961).
357 See id.
358 See id. at 1163 (Sess. 64, June 6, 1961) (witness Ya'akov Friedman).
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mit suicide.359 He would then have to remove the bodies in the morning.360
In addition, the so-called Goebbels' calendar dictated that the sick, infirm
and mentally disoriented prisoners were to be exterminated on Saturdays
and Jewish holidays.36'
Witnesses recounted stories of both petty and profound cruelty.
Dov Frieberg testified that inmates were forced to imitate animals; one pris-
oner was required to wander around on all fours barking and snapping like a
dog.362Others were compelled to sing and dance to anti-semitic songs.3 63
The guards invented various games and indignities such as compelling in-
mates to attempt to scale a building in an effort to close an umbrella
perched on the roof. As these "parachutists" fell, they were beaten, set upon
by a dogs and shot.3 64 Doctor Zalman Kleinman testified that Doctor Josef
Mengele, the infamous impresario of the medical experiments at Au-
schwitz, ordered 2,000 children to assemble on the parade grounds.
Mengele became furious over the attitude of one of the boys and ordered
that a board should be attached to a soccer goal post. The boys were ordered
to walk under the goal; those who were able to walk under the board with-
out bending were designated for extermination.365 Physician Aharon Beilin
testified that he was approached by a young man in the camp who insisted
that Beilin document that the inmate had been castrated: "I want you to see
what they are doing to us. 366
As the Allied Powers advanced, the inmates were marched through
the winter cold to camps within safe and secure German territory. 367 Those
who faltered were summarily shot; the death toll during these treks was
overwhelming. 368 Yehuda Bakon testified that the children on the march
from Auschwitz to Mauthausen expressed gratitude that their parents died
in the gas chambers and avoided the travails and torture of the trek.369
Aharon Beilin testified that during the forced march from Auschwitz that
5000 people were sealed in a uranium mine without sufficient ventilation.
359 See id.
360 See id.
361 See id. at 1262 (Sess. 69, June 6, 1961) (witness Aharon Beilin).
362 See id. at 1172 (Sess. 64, June 5, 1961).
363 See id. at 1170-1171.
364 Id. at 1171-1172.
365 See id. at 1240-1241 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961).
366 Id. at 1263) (Sess. 69, June 7, 1961).
367 See id. at 1249 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961) (witness Yehuda Bakon).
368 See id.
369 See id.
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The prisoners pled for air and a thousand suffocated; they were discovered
dead, their mouths to the floor, gasping for the remaining air pockets.3 70
Substantial testimony was devoted to Jewish resistance. The evi-
dence implicitly rebutted the allegation that the Jews had been complicit in
their own extermination.3 71 A number of witnesses recounted the revolt of
the Sonderkommando, the unit of Jews charged with immolating the
corpses of the dead. 372 The unit managed to blow up a crematorium and
throw two Germans into the flames, but were captured while attempting to
escape.3 73 Among the countless acts of resistance documented at trial was a
plan to set fire to the Auschwitz camp, 374 a revolt at Sobibor in which thir-
teen German and several Ukrainian guards were killed3 7 5 the setting fire to
a fuel tank and escape from Treblinka3 76 and the igniting of a conflagaration
and attempted escape of one thousand children from Auschwitz-Birke-
nau. 377 In one instance, the Germans learned of an escape plan involving
Dutch inmates at Sobibor.378 The guards tortured a prisoner in an unsuc-
cessful effort to elicit information and, in frustration, beheaded seventy
Dutch prisoners.3 79 Mala Zimitbaum, a major figure in the hagiography of
the Holocaust, escaped from Auschwitz in a German uniform with a male
companion.380 She was caught, tortured and paraded before a gathering of
prisoners.38 1 Mala removed a hidden razor blade, sliced her hand and while
bleeding profusely proclaimed that she would die a heroine and prophesized
retribution against the Germans. She was taken away and executed. 382
370 See id. at 1265 (Sess. 69, June 7, 1961).
371 See id. at 468-469 (Sess. 28, May 4, 1961) (discussing the armed resistance of
the Bialystok ghetto). Id. But see id. at 468 (Sess. 28, May 4, 1961). Witness
Avraham Karsik testified that the Jewish Council in the Bialystok ghetto assisted in
handing an individual over the Germans in order to prevent the liquidation of the
ghetto. This is the type of difficult choice presented to the Jewish Councils. Id.
372 See id. at 1249 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961) (witness Yehuda Bakon).
373 See id.
374 See id. at 1247.
375 See id. at 1186 (Sess. 65, June 5, 1961) (witness Ya'akov Biskowitz).
376 See id. at 1210-1211 (Sess. 66, June 6, 1961) (witness Kalman Teigman).
377 See id. at 1292 (Sess. 71, June 6, 1961) (witness of Nahum Hoch).
378 See id. at 1174 (Sess. 64, June 5, 1961) (witness of Dov Freiberg).
379 See id.
380 See id. at 1275 (Sess. 70, June 8, 1961) (testimony of Raya Kagan).
381 See id.
382 See id.
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Eichmann periodically appeared in the prosecution's narrative. Va-
rious witnesses testified that Eichmann visited Auschwitz,38 3a Hungarian
Jewish ghetto384 and Maidanek. 385 Walking past the Jewish prisoners at
Maidanek, Eichmann instructed the guards to "get rid of the whole pile. 38 6
He responded to a letter written to Hitler by a German woman married to a
Jew, in which she pled for her children to be released from the Litzmann-
stadt ghetto by writing, "for reasons of principle I am unable to comply
with the application of Maria Schwartz for the return of her children from
the Ghetto of Lizmannstadt.' '387 In responding to another petition, Eichmann
expressed irritation over the efforts of the Italian Counsel in Danzig to ob-
tain the release of a Jewish women married to an Italian officer. 388 He al-
leged that the incident was being exploited for "atrocity propaganda" 389 and
concluded that the "fate of the Jewish woman Cozzi is sealed;" I have "is-
sued instructions for the Jewess Cozzi to be accommodated in the Riga
concentration camp. '390 Eichmann also rejected a request to refrain from
deporting a Jew, Donati, to Bergen-Belsen who invented a technical proce-
dure that might prove useful to the war effort. He explained that the inven-
tion was already registered in the patent office of the Reich and that "there
is no further interest in the matter here" and Donati should be "on the next
transport. ' 391 Eichmann was determined to prevent his plans from being
impeded by the fact that a number of Jews in the occupied territories were
able to obtain passports from neutral nations and were immune from depor-
tation.392 He wrote that in the event that any Jews are attempting to obtain a
"new nationality, this does not have to be taken into consideration; on the
contrary, the persons concerned are to be given priority for deportation to
the East. 393
Eichmann was not far removed from violence. Yehuda Bakon testi-
fied that one of his acquaintances, Mrs. Ya'akov Edelstein had been sepa-
rated from her husband in Auschwitz, and that Eichmann had personally
guaranteed they would be reunited. Mrs. Edelstein and her son were
383 See id. at 1245 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961) (witness Yehuda Bakon).
384 See id. at 970-971 (Sess. 53, May 25, 1961) (witness Zaeev Sapir).
385 See id. at 1164 (Sess. 64, June 5, 1961) (Ya'akov Friedman).
386 Id.
387 Id. at 387 (Sess. 24, May 2, 1961).
388 See id. at 525 (Sess. 30, May 8, 1961).
389 Id.
390 Id. at 526.
391 Id. at 602 (Sess. 33, May 9, 1961).
392 See id. at 631 (Sess. 35, May 10, 1961).
393 Id. at 631.
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brought together, along with her husband, in one of the crematoriums; all
three were then shot.3 94 Witness Leslie Gordon was arrested in Hungary, in
1944, following the German incursion.395 He was taken to Eichmann's
headquarters at the Majestic Hotel in Budapest, abused, and then deported
to an internment camp where he was brutally beaten and interrogated for
three years.396 Gordon testified that, prior to being taken to the detention
facility, he was confronted with a smug and self-satisfied Adolf Eich-
mann.397 In 1944, Abraham Gordon was conscripted to work at Eichmann's
headquarters in Budapest.398 He testified that he witnessed Eichmann enter
a shed where a young Jewish boy, who was accused of stealing cherries
from a tree, was interned.399 He later saw Eichmann exit the shed with a
blood-stained shirt.4°° Soon after, the young boy was dragged out by the
feet, his face was swollen and bloody, and his limbs were torn apart.40 1
A significant amount of evidence presented was devoted to Eich-
mann's negotiation on behalf of the Reich with Hungarian Jews to permit
one million Jews to depart for Palestine, in exchange for 10,000 trucks.40 2
Eichmann reneged on a promise to halt the deportations to the death camps
during the negotiations. 40 3 When confronted by Hansi Brand concerning the
evacuation of children, he dismissed her, commenting that she was taking
"a great liberty" and, in the event she continued to speak "like that, I advise
you to stop coming to seem me.''4°4 Eichmann later reportedly expressed
satisfaction when an agreement could not be reached.40 5 In October 1944,
he launched a forced-march of thousands of Jews from Budapest, including
children and the elderly.4°6 Himniler reprimanded Eichmann for continuing
to conduct forced-marches of Jews from Hungary to Auschwitz, located in
394 See id. at 1245 (Sess. 68, June 7, 1961).
395 See id. at 1130 (Sess. 62, June 6, 1961).
396 See id.
397 See id.
398 See id. at 976 (Sess. 54, May 26, 1961).
399 See id. at 977-980.
400 See id.
401 See id. at 980.
402 See id. at 1020-1022 (Sess. 56, May 29, 1961) (testimony of Yoel Brand).
403 See id. at 1051 (Sess. 58, May 30, 1961) (testimony of Hansi Brand).
404 Id. at 1052.
405 See id. at 1052.
406 See id. at 1054.
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Poland. 40 7 However, because of Eichmann's substantial power and influ-
ence, Himmler awarded Eichmann a service medal at the same time.40 8
C. Eichmann's Testimony
Defense attorney Robert Servatius relied on a deluge of documen-
tary evidence to establish that Eichmann was a transportation technician
who merely implemented the pernicious plans of the Nazi hierarchy.409 His
guilt was said to pale in comparison to that of the coterie that controlled the
Third Reich. 410
Eichmann consistently characterized his actions as benign, explain-
ing that by assuming responsibility for the evacuation of Jews that he had
introduced order into a chaotic situation in which deportation trains re-
mained stuck and standing for days as a result of poor plan-
ning.41 'Eichmann portrayed himself as subordinate in every detail to
Heinrich Muller, the Head of the Gestapo (Section IV) who, in turn, was
subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, Rein-
hard Heydrich and later Ernst Kalternbrunner. 412 According to Eichmann,
Heinrich Himmer, Reichsfuhrer-SS, would issue an order to Heinrich
Muller to deport a number of Jews. 413 Muller then would then assign por-
tions of this quota to various countries. 414 Despite documents indicating that
Eichmann negotiated with his subordinates assigned to the occupied territo-
ries, he insisted that he merely transmitted deportation directives.415 The
407 See id. at 1118 (affidavit of Kurt Becher).
408 See id.
409 See id. at 1371-1372 (Sess. 75, June 20, 1961).
410 See id. at 1371. Eichmann initially testified that, in Argentina, the Israelis had
handcuffed him to a bed and then required him to declare that he was willing and
ready to be tried by an Israeli court. Id. at 1372. He testified that he joined the
National Socialist Party, in 1932, based on the organization's opposition to the
Versailles Treaty. Id. Eichmann alleged that the attack against the Jews was a
minor part of the early party platform. He complained that following the Reich's
military success, the Hitlerite regime became enthralled and intoxicated with vic-
tory and adopted "stupid, senseless, unrestricted measures and brought about a trag-
edy." Id. at 1373. Eichmann dismissed the endorsement in his promotion papers
that he possessed the requisite "personal severity" as a standard statement. Id. at
1374.
411 See id. at 1378.
412 See id. at 1396-1397 (Sess. 77, June 22, 1961).
413 See id. at 1474 (Sess. 82, June 29, 1961).
414 See id.
415 See id. at 1474-1475.
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destination of the transport, the number of troops and the disposition of the
deportees, as well as other matters, were agreed upon between Muller and
Richard Glucks, superintendent of the concentration camps. 4 16 Eichmann's
self-described role was limited to "timetables, technical transport aspects"
and "negotiations" with the Reich Transport Ministry.4 17 Dieter Wisliceny
testified that he had been ordered to Greece and that Eichmann issued or-
ders that the Jews in Athens and the remainder of Greece were to be imme-
diately "concentrated and deported to Auschwitz. '418 Eichmann claimed
that this order had been issued by Muller 419 and that "it is possible that I did
(transmit the order), but is also possible that he [Wisliceny] received this
order directly from Muller."420 In July 1942, a note indicated that Eichmann
ordered that transports of children from France "can roll."'421 He explained
that Heinrich Himmler ordered the evacuation of the French Jews without
exception and that he merely functioned as a "transmitting agency. 422
Eichmann denied involvement in other incriminating activities. A
January 30, 1942 meeting was convened by the Ministry for European Oc-
cupied Territories to determine which individuals should be considered
Jews. 423 Eichmann's section was represented, but he claimed that he "did
not deal with this; it was purely a legal matter. '424 Eichmann also claimed
that the requirement that 1,000 Jews be transported in train cars with a ca-
pacity of 700 was a decision of the Ministry of Transport.425 He explained
that the 700 capacity was based on military transports in which individual
soldiers carried their bags; in the case of Jews, he explained that separate
baggage cars were attached to the train.
426
416 See id. at 1473-1474. Eichmann testified that the Head Office for Reich Secur-
ity, Section IVB4, the S.S. Leadership Head Office and Inspector of Concentration
Camps, and the relevant camp all were contacted concerning the departure of the
transport. Id. at 1473.
417 See id. at 1390 (Sess. 76, June 21, 1961).
418 Id. at 1499 (Sess. 84, July 3, 1961).
419 See id. at 1500.
420 Id.
421 Id. at 1475 (Sess. 82, June 29, 1961).
422 Id. Eichmann signed a telegram authorizing the execution of Jews and, once
again, claimed that he was implementing the orders of superiors. Id. at 1433-1434
(Sess. 79, June 26, 1961).
423 See id. at 1420 (Sess. 78, June 23, 1961).
424 Id.
425 See id. at 1432 (Sess. 79, June 26, 1961).
426 See id.
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In other instances, Eichmann denied knowledge of events. A draft
letter from the Reich Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories indi-
cated that Eichmann agreed to the procurement of gassing equipment.427
Eichmann, however, claimed that his name had been "inserted wrongly"
and that "I never received a letter of this nature, and I do not know whether
these drafts were ever actually dispatched." 428 As for his alleged remark that
Serbian Jews should be shot since they could not be deported to the East,
Eichmann claimed that "I made no such comment and I could not have
done so, because such a comment would have gone far beyond my area of
competence. '429 He also denied defying the Hungarian government by de-
porting a Jewish transport: "I did not myself take decisions even in minor
matters.... But in any case I do not know anything about such a matter. 430
Eichmann testified that he was informed by Heydrich, in the late
summer or early fall of 1942, that the "Fuhrer has ordered the destruction,
the physical destruction of Jewry. ' ' 4 3 1 Eichmann was ordered to Lublin,
where he observed the sealing of cottages in preparation for the gassing of
Jews.432 He then traveled to the incorporated Polish territory, where was
informed that Jews were being gassed to death.433 In Minsk, Eichmann ob-
served the extermination of Jews standing in a ditch, including a child being
shot out of a mother's arms.434 Eichmann then proceeded to Auschwitz,
where he testified that he observed the burning of corpses.4 35 He claimed
that he monitored and reported on these activities, but did not issue direc-
tives or demands. 436 Eichmann testified that, despite his deep misgivings, he
conducted these inspections out of a sense of obligation and duty. 43 7 He
reported that he was particularly shaken when he passed a site where Jews
427 See id. at 1418 (Sess. 78, June 23, 1961).
428 Id.
429 Id. at 1492 (Sess. 83, June 30, 1961). Eichmann also denied involvement in the
alleged killing of a juvenile who was alleged to have stolen cherries. Id. at 1548
(Sess. 87, July 6, 1961).
430 Id. at 1548.
431 Id. at 1559 (Sess. 87, July 6, 1961).
432 See id. at 1560.
433 See id.
434 See id.
435 See id.
436 See id.
437 See id. "I came into contact [with the extermination of the Jews] against my
will-I had to obey. I had to do it. I cannot state anything further on this matter."
Id. at 1561.
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had been executed and witnessed that "the pressure of the gases" had led to
"blood ... shooting out of the earth like a fountain. '438
Eichmann concluded his direct testimony by pronouncing that he
had to "carry out the transports in accordance with my orders" and that he
was "aware of the fact that some of these people were killed in the
camps. '439 However, he denied having ever proclaimed that he had "any-
one's death on my conscience;" 440 and contended that only those who is-
sued the orders "can have a guilt feeling in the legal sense, since in the
absence of responsibility, there can in the end be no guilt."441 In the end, the
basis of all organized States is "order and obedience. No political system
can seriously be based on spies and traitors." 442 According to Eichmann, his
misfortune was that he was in uniform and obligated to obey a regime that
ordered the extermination of the Jews. He was in the same situation as mil-
lions of others who found themselves subordinate to the legal requirements
of obedience.44 3 In the end, he was "simply a tool in the hands of stronger
powers and strong forces, and of an inexorable fate." 4
D. Eichmann's Cross-Examination
Prosecutor Gideon Hausner next cross-examined Eichmann regard-
ing the accused's admission that he was an "accomplice to the murder of
millions of Jews."44 5 Eichmann conceded that "I must admit that I have
played my part, though under orders.... [A]s a recipient of orders, I had no
choice but to carry out the orders I received."446 Eichmann cautioned that
the determination of his legal guilt must be delayed until the extent of his
bureaucratic responsibility was determined. 44 7
Eichmann continued to avow that he had no animus towards the
Jews and claimed that his statement that he would happily leap into his
grave with the satisfaction that five million perished along with him was
438 Id. at 1561.
439 Id. at 1568 (Sess. 88, July 7, 1961).
440 Id. at 1567.
441 Id. at 1568. Eichmann viewed ethical guilt as a matter of personal judgment and
evaluation. He stated that "you argue with yourself, and you are your own judge. I
have done it in my own case, and I am still doing it." Id.
442 Id.
443 See id.
444 Id.
445 Id. at 1575 (Sess., 88, July 7, 1961).
446 Id.
447 See id.
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aimed at all foreign and domestic "enemies of the Reich," including
Jews.448 Although Eichmann regarded the Jews as adversaries, he claimed
that he favored their emigration rather than extermination.449 His aspiration
was for the Jews to have their "own land, a country of their own under their
feet. '450 Eichmann claimed that on numerous occasions that he approached
his superiors in an effort to resign.451 He dismissed affidavits attesting to his
harsh approach to issues of Jewish emigration and insisted that these mat-
ters were "purely for the legal experts" and that "non-lawyers were not
even allowed to take part. '452 Eichmann also claimed that his statement
calling for a "'more elegant way"' of dispatching the Jews following his
visit to the Eastern Territories referred to a peaceful political method rather
than to the utilization of poison gas.453
The accused tended to diminish his depredations and proclaimed
that he was determined to dispel the "landslide of untruth. '454 In response to
an interrogation concerning the Nisko Plan in which he admitted sending
Jews to an abandoned and barren area in Poland with water poisoned by
typhoid, Eichmann alleged that Jewish leaders enthusiastically embraced
this project. 455 He claimed to have been unaware that Polish farmers had
been unable to cultivate the area, testified that he warned the deportees of
the typhoid threat and reminded the court that the area was "not the
worst. '456 Eichmann claimed that he was demoralized by the demise of the
Madagascar Plan and reluctantly concluded that he was "too weak and too
powerless" 457 to secure a "normal solution" to the Jewish question.458
448 See id. at 1575 (Sess. 88, July 7, 1961). Eichmann stated that he considered the
Jews to be enemies following the statement of Zionist leader Chaim Weitzmann, in
1939, that the Jews would support the Allied cause. Id. at 1576.
449 See id. at 1582.
450 Id.
451 See id. at 1643 (Sess. 94, July 12, 1961).
452 Id. at 1736 (Sess. 100, July 18, 1961) (affidavit of Bernard Loesner of the De-
partment of Interior alleging that Eichmann favored deportation from Germany of
the children of mixed marriages).
453 See id. at 1706 (Sess. 98, July 17, 1961).
454 Id. at 1605 (Sess. 91, July 11, 1961).
455 See id. at 1602-1603 (Sess. 91, July 11, 1961).
456 Id. at 1603. Hans Frank, the Governor General of Poland, objected to the emi-
gration of additional Jews and the project was cancelled. Id.
457 Id. at 1609.
458 Id. at 1610.
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Eichmann dismissed the prosecution's claim that he was the pri-
mary and preeminent person on Jewish affairs, 459 noted that his responsibil-
ity was limited to matters of transit,460 and characterized Heydrich's
comment at Wannsee that he was the Specialist Officer for Jewish Affairs
as a mischaracterization. 461 Eichmann claimed that he was a cipher and
only acted in accordance with the commands and established policies of his
superiors, Gestapo Chief Heinrich Muller and the Chief of the Security Po-
lice and Security Service, Reinhard Heydrich and later Ernst Kaltenbrun-
ner.462 He stated that documents that credited him with policy
determinations on issues such as the treatment of Jews in Italy, were inaccu-
rate:463 "I did not indicate any of my opinions, nor was I authorized to do
so, and in these cases I had to obtain the instructions of my superiors.
' 464
Eichmann was interrogated concerning a note from one of his operatives,
Theodore Dannecker, indicating that he "decided" that Jewish children were
to be deported from France to the Governor General. 465 Eichmann re-
sponded that he was "unable to attach any importance or significance to the
word 'decided.' ' 466 Questioned about the death of Polish children during a
transport, he pled that "I was not responsible for these matters. I was re-
sponsible for the matters concerning the timetable for the technical matters,
but not for these things. '467 The accused contended that the number to be
deported was determined in accordance with directives from his superiors
459 See id. at 1625 (Sess. 93, July 12, 1961).
460 See id. at 1623 (Sess. 91, July 11, 1961).
461 See id. at 1622-1623.
462 See id. at 1610-1611 (Sess. 91, July 11, 1961). Eichmann noted that he signed
his letters, Im Auftrage or I.A., meaning "behalf of someone else." Id. at 1610. The
prosecution characterized this as a matter of protocol. Id. at 1611.
463 See id. at 1625-1626 (Sess. 93, July 12, 1961).
464 Id. at 1626. Eichmann estimated that he dealt with 150-200 matters per week
and that roughly 50-60 were discussed with Muller. The others were processed
according to previously established policies. Id. at 1678 (Sess. 93, July 14, 1961).
465 See id. at 1647 (Sess. 94, July 12, 1961).
466 Id. Eichmann noted that the decision had taken ten days and that had he made
the determination on his own that the decision would have been taken within three
or four days. Id.
467 Id. at 1700 (Sess. 98, July 17, 1961). He later denied awareness that "scores and
hundreds" that he deported from the Lublin Ghetto to Auschwitz would be extermi-
nated, but conceded that "I did hear and read about that." Id. at 1643 (Sess. 94, July
12, 1961).
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and that the destinations were established by the Inspector of Concentration
Camps.468
Eichmann claimed that bureaucratic confusion and complexity was
responsible for the fact that his office received inquiries and issued direc-
tives on matters unrelated to transport such as the arrest of Polish priests
and the public hanging of Jews. 469 Eichmann claimed that he had been re-
quested by Heydrich to deliver documents to Odilo Globocnik, Security
Service Chief in Lublin, authorizing the execution of hundreds of thousands
of Jews. 470 He also had been ordered to issue directives prohibiting clerics
from congregating in the vicinity of Jewish labor camps,471 appointing the
commander of a concentration camp,472 marking Jews with badges,4 7 3 and
preventing the emigration of wealthy Jews from Rumania.474 In other in-
stances, such as the collection of Jewish skeletons, he disputed his involve-
ment475 or, as in the case of the execution of the Jewish children in Lidice,
claimed that Muller delegated this to Eichmann's subordinate Rolf Gunther
without Eichmann's knowledge. 476 Eichmann denied having attended a
meeting with Heydrich, on September 21, 1939, in which the long-term
goal of the extermination of Jews in Poland was outlined.477 Confronted
with documents recording his attendance, Eichmann retracted his denial and
claimed that he did not recall the meeting. 478 Eichmann also claimed that he
was not aware of the deployment of poison gas and that this task had been
assigned to his assistant Hans Gunther.479 He was unable to explain his in-
volvement in issuing instructions pertaining to the Warsaw Ghetto and for
signing death certificates which concealed the cause of death of the ghetto-
ized Jews.480 Eichmann conceded that he proposed the forced-march of
Hungarian Jewry, but contended that the Hungarians organized and con-
ducted the trek.481 Challenged to designate the legal basis for the orders to
468 See id. at 1631 (Sess. 93, July 12, 1961).
469 See id. at 1700-1701 (Sess. 98, July 17, 1961).
470 See id. at 1712 (Sess. 99, July 17, 1961).
471 See id. at 1740 (Sess. 101, July 18, 1961).
472 See id. at 1741.
473 See id. at 1413-1414 (Sess. 78, June 23, 1961).
474 See id. at 1629 (Sess. 93, July 12, 1961).
47- See id. at 1748-1749 (Sess. 101, July 18, 1961).
476 See id. at 1745.
477 See id. at 1599 (Sess. 91, July 11, 1961).
478 See id. at 1600.
479 See id. at 1653-1655 (Sess. 95, July 13, 1961).
480 See id. at 1716 (Sess. 99, July 17, 1961).
481 See id. at 1786-1787 (Sess. 104, July 20, 1961).
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deport Jews, throughout Europe, Eichmann could only reply that this was
not his concern as a section head and that "I am not a lawyer. I had to obey.
I had only learned the life of a soldier. '482
Eichmann was questioned concerning the December 1941 deporta-
tion of German Jews to Riga and Minsk at a time when he was aware that
Operation Units were exterminating Jews. 483 He claimed that he had not
anticipated that Jews from the Reich would be shot.484 Eichmann neverthe-
less stressed that regardless of "[w]hether they were to be killed or not,
orders had to be carried out. '485 Higher echelon officials could defy orders,
but Eichmann testified that he enjoyed no such prerogative.486 Yet, he con-
ceded that on several occasions that he proceeded without the required au-
thorization of the Foreign Ministry or misled the Foreign Ministry. 48 7 For
instance, he represented to the Foreign Ministry that only able-bodied Jews
were to be deported from Rumania while obtaining Muller's endorsement
to deport the aged and the infirm.488
Despite his alleged misgivings, Eichmann testified that, after view-
ing the bodies of dead Germans and Jews, he became inured to death.489 He
testified that "[giradually, I reached a stage where neither German dead
bodies nor Jewish dead bodies, nor any other dead bodies had that effect on
me, like the first dead bodies that I saw."490 Still, Eichmann expressed relief
that he was not involved in the extermination process and claimed that he
implored Muller that he could not tolerate the carnage and requested to be
reassigned.491
At what date was Eichmann aware that he was transporting Jews to
their death and that he was complicit in their extermination? The prosecu-
tion presumably hoped to establish that his early awareness of the plans to
eradicate Jews attested to the centrality of his role in the extermination pro-
cess.492 Eichmann insisted that this was not clear until the Wannsee Confer-
482 Id. at 1733 (Sess. 100, July 18, 1961). Eichmann also claimed that he only was
involved in deportations within a small portion of the Government General. Id. at
1728-1730.
483 See id. at 1637 (Sess. 93, July 12, 1961).
484 See id.
485 Id.
486 See id.
487 See id. at 1684-1685 (Sess. 97, July 14, 1961).
488 See id. at 1685.
489 See id. at 1643 (Sess. 94, July 12, 1961).
490 Id.
491 See id. at 1661 (Sess. 95, July 13, 1961).
492 See infra notes 493-500.
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ence of January 20, 1942. 493 He claimed that when he wrote the Foreign
Ministry, on November 19, 1941, concerning the prohibition of the emigra-
tion of a Jews in light of the approaching "Final Solution of the Jewish
Question in Europe" that this connoted the Madagascar Plan.494 The prose-
cution, however, pointed out that the Madagascar proposal had been aban-
doned in August 1940495 and the accused acknowledged that when he issued
orders, on October 10, 1941, to deport 50,000 from Germany, Austria and
Czechoslovakia to Riga and Minsk, that the phrase Final Solution could not
have connoted the Madagascar Plan.496 The prosecution then noted that the
phrase Final Solution also had been utilized in Eichmann's communiques
pertaining to the deportation of German Jews from Yugoslavia in March
1941497 and the evacuation of Jews from France and Belgium, in May
1941.498 In addition, the prosecution pointed out that Eichmann was the
recipient of reports from Operation Units in Russia, in July 1941, concern-
ing the extermination of Jews.499 This was the thirteenth such report re-
ceived by Eichmann and the prosecution reminded him that by July 1941
"[i]t was no longer particularly surprising for you to hear that entire Jewish
communities had simply been slaughtered. 500
Despite Eichmann's characterization of the extermination of Jews
as "one of the most heinous crimes in the history of mankind,' 501 he re-
sponded to a prosecutorial inquiry by describing a hypothetical individual
involved in the Final Solution as an "unhappy man" rather than as a "crimi-
nal. '50 2 Pressed as to whether Rudolf Hoss, the Commandant of Auschwitz,
was a criminal, Eichmann replied that he "pitied him and felt sorry for
him," but refused to "reveal my innermost feelings. °50 3
493 See id. at 1627 (Sess. 93, July 12, 1961). "I have after all never denied that
unfortunately I did know that some of the Jews who were deported were sent for
extermination. I have never denied that. I could not deny that." Id. at 1634.
494 Id at 1613.
495 See id. at 1619.
496 See id. at 1615.
497 See id. at 1618.
498 See id. at 1617.
499 See id. at 1757 (Sess. 102, July 19, 1961).
500 Id. at 1758.
501 Id. at 1662 (Sess. 95, July 11, 1961).
502 See id. at 1661.
503 Id.
2002 THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 97
E. Closing Arguments
The prosecution characterized Eichmann's testimony as obstruc-
tionistic and obfuscated.50 4 Eichmann disingenuously avowed that Germany
had been pushed into war by foreign forces whose efforts were endorsed by
the Jewish community.50 5 Although Eichmann acknowledged that millions
were mangled, murdered and massacred,506 he contended that he was a mere
functionary and transportation technician and was not culpable for these
crimes.50 7 Prosecutor Gideon Hausner, however, insisted that, despite Eich-
mann's minimization of his role, he performed an "executive function" in
the deportation, ghettoization and extermination of the Jews.50 8
The prosecution recounted that Eichmann's success in expelling
Jews from Vienna and Bohemia resulted in his assignment to Berlin.50 9 The
full force of German totalitarian technique and technology then was de-
voted to the forced emigration and eventual deportation of German
Jewry.5 10 Eichmann's name appeared on the roster of attendees at a meeting
on September 21, 1939, at which Heydrich announced that Jews would be
removed from the annexed portions of Germany to the Polish territories
comprising the Government General.5 11 The displaced Jews were to be
ghettoized and a Council of Elders was to be created, which would be com-
pelled to cooperate in the eventual deportation and extermination of the
Jewish population.512 Eichmann contended that he persevered through
pangs of conscience and that he implored his superiors to release him from
his responsibilities.5 13 The prosecutor, however, pointed out that there was
no written record of such a petition and that requests for release were regu-
larly approved.5 14
In 1939, Eichmann devised the disastrous deportation of Jews from
the Reich, Austria and the Protectorate to Nisko.515 He then propelled the
Madagascar plan, which would have cleansed Europe of Jews and con-
504 See id. at 1973 (Sess. 110, Aug. 8, 1961).
505 See id.
506 See id.
507 See id. at 1975.
508 See id.
509 See id. at 1976-1977.
510 See id. at 1978.
511 See id.
512 See id.
513 See id. at 1983-1984.
514 See id. at 1984.
515 See id. at 1998.
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demned the deportees to an uncertain future.516 Heydrich subsequently indi-
cated his confidence in Eichmann's capacity to carry out the extermination
of the Jews when he appointed him to direct Jewish Affairs in the Ge-
stapo.517 Hausner noted that it was a testimony to Eichmann's effectiveness
and efficiency that he remained in this post dedicated to the death and dep-
redation of European Jewry for five years.518
Eichmann claimed that he was not in a position to make recommen-
dations, let alone decisions, but merely followed orders.5 19 Prosecutor
Hausner pointed out that this was no different from the situation of the other
major figures in the Nazi regime who were subordinate to Adolf Hitler.520
Eichmann conceded that he was a link in the chain of command and was
responsible for the transport of Jews to camps with full awareness that they
were to be exterminated.5 21 The prosecution noted that this admission of
complicity in the Final Solution sufficed to convict the accused.522
However, the prosecution stressed that this was not the entire extent
of Eichmann's portfolio. 523 Hausner alleged that Eichmann was the chief
representative of Himmler and of the Chief of the Security Police and of the
Head of the Gestapo on Jewish questions and acted on their behalf in mat-
ters pertaining to the Jews.524 Following Wannsee, Heydrich wrote that
Eichmmann was his "authorized representative; 5 25 Eichmann's central role
was independently noted by affiants ranging from the Head of the Office
for Reich Security Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Foreign Minister Heinrich Him-
mler, Luftwaffe Commander General Karl Koller, Governor General of the
Government General Hans Frank, Chief of the Economic Administrative
Head Office Oswald Pohl, Commandant of Auschwitz Rudolf Hoss and
Hermann Goring, Marshal of the Greater German Reich. 526 Hausner re-
minded the Court of the fact that thousands of other individuals, ministries
516 See id. at 1985.
517 See id. at 1986.
518 See id. at 1987.
519 See id. at 1987-1988.
520 See id. at 1988.
521 See id.
522 See id.
523 See id. at 1990-1991.
524 See id. at 1993.
525 Id. at 1991.
526 See id. at 1990-1991. Thousands of documents were destroyed. The only mate-
rial relating to the Government General were those pertaining to the treatment of
foreign nationals. Id. at 1991.
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and departments being involved in the Nazi's satanic schemes did not
lessen Eichmann's guilt.527
Following Wannsee, the prosecution recounted that the entire Euro-
pean continent was transformed into a hunting ground for Eichmann in
which Jews were located, marked and ghettoized.528 The prosecution chal-
lenged the accused's contention that he only was concerned with foreign
citizens rather than indigenous Poles and Jews within the Government Gen-
eral.529 Eichmann's version was belied by his meetings with Odilio
Globocnik at which the prosecution contended that the accused authorized,
rather than merely ratified, the extermination of three quarters of a million
Jews. 530
Hausner pointed out that Eichmann's central role was indicated by
Rademacher's note concerning the Jews of Serbia, which recorded "Eich-
mann proposes killing them by shooting. '53 1 Eichmann contended that the
note was a fabrication.5 32 The prosecution, however, observed that this indi-
cated that Rademacher viewed Eichmann as so powerful that the mere men-
tion of his name would legitimize and justify Rademacher's otherwise illicit
actions.533
The prosecution noted that Eichmann conceded he was criminally
culpable for having arranged timetables and transport for deportees know-
ing that he was actively assisting the extermination of Jews.534 He admitted
on cross-examination that he sent many deportees, including Jews from the
Reich, to camps administered by killing squad commanders Arthur Nebe
and Emil Otto Rasch with full knowledge that the deportees would be exter-
minated. 535 The documentary evidence indicated that Eichmann sought a
pure and pristine technological process of extermination, but the accused
527 See id. at 1991.
528 See id.
529 See id.
530 See id. at 1992. The prosecution also pointed to the documentary evidence
linking Eichmann to the Warsaw Ghetto and an instruction from Section IVB4
indicating that involuntary Jewish laborers working for an oil company in the
Beskids mountains only should be evacuated to the extent required. Id. at 1992.
Eichmann also was in charge of amending the so-called "Brown File" which set
forth directives for dealing with Jews in the Eastern Occupied Territories. Id. at
2005-2006 (Sess. 111, Aug. 8, 1961).
531 Id. at 1995 (Sess. 111, Aug. 8, 1961).
532 See id.
533 See id.
534 See id. at 1996.
535 See id. at 2003-2004.
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claimed that he had been unaware that Muller detailed Gunther to obtain
poison gas.5 36 Yet, Hausner noted that Eichmann had personally witnessed
the killing of Jews by exhaust fumes, and that there was little reason for
Muller to conceal the employment of poison gas from Eichmann.5 37 The
evidence also indicated that the accused was involved in exhuming and de-
stroying corpses in an effort to cover-up the Nazi's crimes.5 38
Eichmann was described by Hausner as roaming throughout Europe
supervising the efforts of his operatives and visiting concentration camps.5 39
He effectively controlled the model camp of Terezin and as the tide turned
against the Reich, Eichmann began evacuating the internees to Au-
schwitz.5 40 Eichmann's five or six visits to Auschwitz coincided with the
arrival of large transports of Jews. 541 According to the prosecution, Eich-
mann determined the immediate fate of these deportees.5 42 Hausner also
alleged that Eichmann played a significant role in other camps, supervising
the maintenance and operation of gas vans at Chelmno and receiving re-
ports on the arrival and disposition of Jews in a host of camps in the area of
Lublin Poland.5 43 As defeat loomed, Eichmann took charge of the evacua-
tion of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz 44 and succeeded in deporting
437,402 Jews to their death.545
Dr. Robert Servatius, in rebuttal, argued that the characterization of
Eichmann as a central component of the Nazi conspiracy was flawed and
fictitious; this could only serve to veil the vicious venality of high-ranking
Nazis. 546 Servatius attacked the statutory scheme that provided Israel juris-
diction beyond its national borders547 for crimes against the "Jewish Peo-
ple.' '548 This was an enormous extension of international jurisdiction which
536 See id. at 2005.
537 See id.
538 See id.
539 See id. at 2006-2007.
540 See id. at 2008 (Sess. 112, Aug. 9, 1961). As the war drew to a close, Eich-
mann transformed Terezin into site for the liquidation of Jews in mixed marriages.
Id.
541 See id. at 2010.
542 See id. The prosecution noted that Eichmann was approached to arrange for
collection of skeletons. Id.
543 See id. at 2009. These included Belzec, Treblinka and Wolczek. Id.
544 See id. at 2014.
545 See id. at 2016.
546 See id. at 2046 (Sess. 114, Aug. 14, 1961).
547 See id. at 2047.
548 Id. at 2050.
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was traditionally based on the conventional categories of citizenship and
territory. 549 Servatius also noted that the State of Israel did not exist at the
time of Eichmann's alleged transgressions and, in any event, Israel could
not now retroactively assert jurisdiction.550
Servatius again stressed that Eichmann was a mere administrative
adjunct who transmitted directives from his superiors and that he was not
empowered to make autonomous decisions.55 ' Eichmaann was well aware
that in the event of defeat that he would be singled out as a scapegoat and,
for that reason, carefully documented his directives.552
Servatius challenged the prosecution's pronouncement that Hun-
gary was emblematic of Eichmann's central role as the "Master" of the
deportation and destruction of Jewry.5 53 Servatius argued that the plans for
the deportation of Jews was carried out by the Hungarian police and viru-
lently anti-semitic Arrow Cross organization. 554 Eichmann's role was lim-
ited to meeting the trains at the German border and directing them to
Auschwitz or to other assigned destinations. 555 Servatius recounted that
Eichmann accepted without protest the decision of Hungarian Regent Mi-
klos Horthy, in 1944, to halt the evacuation of the country's remaining
Jewish population.55 6 Horthy was removed by the Germans and the Nazi
Foreign Ministry exerted pressure on his successor, Frenc Szlasi, leader of
the pro-Nazi Arrow Cross, to resume the evacuations. 55 7 This resulted in
Eichmann receiving orders to initiate the death-dealing treks to Au-
schwitz558 Following the war, those responsible attributed the atrocities in
Hungary to the accused whose absence prevented him from proffering a
defense.559
Servatius argued that Eichmann had not been in a position to evalu-
ate the criminality of commands issued by his superiors. 560 The most com-
pelling obligation of subordinates, such as the accused, was to demonstrate
549 See id.
550 See id.
551 See id. at 2058-2059.
552 See id. at 2059.
553 Id. at 2055.
554 See id.
555 See id.
556 See id.
557 See id.
558 See id.
559 See id.
560 See id. at 2061.
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loyalty to the State.561 Servatius pointed out that there was a measure of
hypocrisy underlying Eichmann's trial, since the Allied Powers had been
unwilling to extend assistance to European Jews. 562 While there was no de-
nial of the tragedy of the Jews, Servatius cautioned that the condemnation
of Eichmann' s criminal conduct must be tempered by an appreciation of the
fact that this atrocity was equaled by the extermination of native peoples in
North and South America, the enforced slavery of Africans, the elimination
of Australian Aborigines, the persecution of the Jews in Spain and of the
Huguenots in France.563
The defense again stressed that Nazi elites were able to avoid direct
involvement in crimes.564 Those in position of obedience, however, did not
enjoy this luxury, and disobedience would have been futile and would have
met with instantaneous retribution. 565 In the end, the Holocaust was a crime
attributable to high-level State decision-makers for which low-level opera-
tives should not be held culpable. 566
Servatius argued that Eichmann should be placed in the same posi-
tion as he would have been had a lawful extradition request been filed.567
This would result in Eichmann's trial and punishment being barred under
Argentinian law by the tolling of the statute of limitations. 568 Such an order
would be consistent with Jewish law, which traditionally recognized that in
the course of time forgiveness was appropriate.5 69 The defense argued that
the Court should be content with the fact that the proceedings had supple-
mented the historical record and the Tribunal should eschew revenge or
retribution. 570 Servatius stressed that in the end that the intricate and
profound issues raised by this trial were the terrain and turf of philosophers,
theologians and historians rather than legal experts. 571
561 See id.
562 See id.
563 See id.
564 See id.
565 See id.
566 See id. at 2062.
567 See id. at 2063.
568 See id.
569 See id.
570 See id.
571 See id. at 2050.
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F. The Verdict And Sentencing
The District Court ruled that Eichmann was aware, as early as June
1941, of the plans for the extermination of the Jews and, in August 1941,
initiated a course of action in furtherance of this cruel campaign of biologi-
cal extermination.5 72 The Tribunal ruled that Eichmann must be condemned
as a principal and accessory in the "comprehensive crime" of the Final So-
lution.573 The Supreme Court fully concurred with the decision of the lower
court.574 The Appellate Tribunal stressed that Eichmann had been entrusted
by Heydrich, the chief of the Reich Security Service, with the extermination
of eleven million Jews and was "no mere 'cog,' small or large, in a machine
propelled by others; he was himself, one of those who propelled the ma-
chine. '575 Eichmann's guilt was indisputable; he freely conceded that he
had been aware that those transported to the concentration camps were con-
demned to die.5 76 The Supreme Court also found that Eichmann passion-
ately pursued, detained and denied safe passage to Jews, and devoted
himself to developing devices of death.57 7 The Court concluded with a
moral condemnation of Eichmann's failure to display "remorse or weakness
or sapping of strength or weakening of will in performing the task he had
undertaken. '578 He carried out "his unspeakably horrible crimes with genu-
ine whole-hearted joy and pleasure, to his own gratification and the satis-
faction of all his superiors. 579
Eichmann was convicted on all counts.5 80 Israeli Attorney General
Gideon Hausner argued at the sentencing hearing that the accused "ex-
cluded himself by the horrors of his actions from human society;" these
were "rampaging destructive and bloodthirsty" actions."'581 The Attorney
General concluded with the observation that "[i]f Adolf Eichmann is not
sentenced to the severest penalty ... then this penalty has no significance
572 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 235.
573 Id.
574 See Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 279.
575 Id. at 331.
576 See id. at 332.
577 See id.
578 Id. at 341.
579 Id.
580 See Transcript, supra note 278, at 2205-2206 (Sess. 119, Dec. 12, 1961). Eich-
mann was convicted under counts one through four, but was acquitted of all acts
under these counts committed between March 1938 and October 1941. Id. at 2205.
This conduct was punished under crimes against humanity pursuant to counts five
through seven. Id.
581 Id. at 2212 (Sess. 120, Dec. 13, 1961).
2002 103
104 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 8
whatsoever. . . .If he is not punished for his crime, there will be no one
anywhere in the world who will deserve this penalty. 582
Robert Servatius, in rebuttal, argued for mitigation of Eichmann's
sentence, based on the fact that Eichmann merely acted in obedience to
orders issued by his superiors. 583 Servatius stressed that there was nothing
the accused could have done to ameliorate the consequences of his acts and
neither insubordination nor suicide would have changed the course of
events.5 84 This was a crisis of human psychology: Eichmann was emblem-
atic of the susceptibility of modem humankind to the clarion call of mass
conformity. 585 The center of this cultural crisis was a lack of leadership
rather than a lock-step subordination. 58 6 Servatius also argued that the
proper measure of punishment was to be determined by the laws of the
Federal Republic of Germany, which had abolished capital punishment.58 7
In addressing the Court, Adolf Eichmann expressed disappointment
in the Court's failure to provide him a fair trial and proclaimed that he
could not "recognize the verdict of guilty. 588 Eichmann contended that he
had been led to murder by his superiors, and that his guilt resulted from his
sense of loyalty and adherence to his oath of allegiance. 589 As a subordinate,
he himself was a victim. 590 He concluded with the admonition that, "I am
not the monster that I am made out to be," claiming he had been the "vic-
tim" of "untruths. 591 Eichmann insisted that he had been convicted of
crimes committed by others and proclaimed that, " I am utterly convinced
that I must suffer here for others. I must bear what fate imposes on me. 592
Presiding Judge Moshe Laundau asserted that capital punishment
was the only suitable punishment for crimes of such "unparalleled horror"
in "nature" and in "scope. 593 The objective of Eichmann's delicts was to
"obliterate an entire people from the face of the earth. '594 The dispatch of
each boxcar implicated the accused as an accomplice in the premeditated
582 Id. at 2215.
583 See id.
584 See id.
585 See id.
586 See id. at 2216.
587 See id.
588 Id.
589 See id.
590 See id.
591 Id. at 2217.
592 Id.
593 Id. at 2218 (Sess. 121, Dec. 15, 1961).
594 Id.
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murder of a thousand human beings.5 95 Furthermore, Eichmann's acts in-
volved an additional degree of depredation, in that this comprehensive
crime was calibrated to exterminate an entire religion. 596 His degree of legal
and moral responsibility was "not one iota less than the responsibility of the
person who with his own hands pushed these human beings into the gas
chambers."5 97
The District Court recognized that Eichmann may have acted under
orders, but that this neither excused nor justified "crimes of such magni-
tude. '598 At any rate, Eichmann required little encouragement; he harbored
a passionate and fierce determination to cleanse Europe of Jews. 599 He was
sentenced to death for crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes. 60 0
The Supreme Court later affirmed the District Court's sentence of
death, 60 1 concluding that the Israeli legislature "could not have envisaged a
criminal greater than Adolf Eichmann, and if we are not to frustrate the will
of the legislature, we must impose on Eichmann the maximum penalty...
the penalty of death."602 The following day, May 31, 1962, a clemency peti-
tion was rejected by Yitzhak Ben Zvi, the President of the State of Israel. 60 3
As the hangman's noose was slipped over Eichmann's neck, he proclaimed
that "I had to obey the rules of war and my flag.''604 As requested in Eich-
mann's will, his body was cremated; 60 5 the Israelis scattered the ashes in the
Mediterranean. 606
IX. LEGAL ISSUES
A. Legal Issues
The Jerusalem trial of Adolf Eichmann raised several significant
legal issues, including the neutrality of Israeli judges, the legality of Eich-
mann's kidnapping, the extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction of the Is-
595 See id.
596 See id.
597 Id.
598 Id.
599 See id.
600 See id.
601 See Transcript, supra note 278, at 2243 (Sup. Ct. Proc., Sess 1, Mar. 22, 1962).
602 Id. at 2369 (Sess. 7, May 29, 1962).
603 See PEARLMAN, supra note 69, at 627.
604 Id. at 628.
605 See id.
606 See id. at 628-629.
2002
106 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 8
raeli court, the retroactivity of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Act, and the admissibility of the Act of State and superior
orders defenses. The District and Supreme Court's disposition of these is-
sues is summarized in the following sections. 607
B. The Recusal of Israeli Judges
Doctor Servatius argued prior to trial that there was a "justified
apprehension" that the District Court panel would exhibit "prejudice" since
both the Israeli State and Jewish People possessed a "political interest" in
the outcome of the trial.608 Attorney General Hausner responded that "lilt is
possible to have a fair trial even when the judges are required to suppress
within their hearts their personal or national anguish, and to judge accord-
ing to the evidence which is before them. ' 6°9
The District Court refused to accept the argument that the Israeli
judiciary was disqualified from hearing the Eichmann case, ruling that the
judges are professionals who are "accustomed to weighing evidence" and
that they are likely to be well-aware that they are making these decisions
"under the critical gaze of the public" and of "learned and experienced"
lawyers. 610 A judge "does not cease to be flesh and blood. ' 611 However, the
judge is obligated and required by law to "subdue these emotions and im-
pulses," otherwise a judicial officer would never to able "to consider a
criminal charge which arouses feelings of revulsion, such as treason, mur-
der or any other grave crime. 612
C. Eichmann's Abduction
Robert Servatius argued that Eichmann had been kidnapped by Is-
raeli agents and that the District Court should divest itself of jurisdiction in
order to avoid legitimizing this illegal act.61 3 Attorney General Gideon
Hausner, on the other hand, contended that there were well-established En-
glish and American precedents that the judiciary will not inquire into the
circumstances of an individual's arrest and appearance before the court.614
607 See generally, PAPADATOS, supra note 10.
608 Transcript, supra note 278, at 8 (Sess. 1, Apr. 11, 1961).
609 Id. at 12.
610 Id. at 60 (Sess. 6, April 17, 1961).
611 Id.
612 Id. This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. Judgment,
supra note 12, at 319.
613 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 57.
614 See id. at 58.
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The District Court ruled that an individual prosecuted for an offense
against the laws of a State may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegal-
ity of his arrest or of the means whereby he was bought within the jurisdic-
tion of that State. 615 In any event, Eichmann lacked standing to raise the
alleged illegality of his appearance before the court.616 Argentina was the
aggrieved party whose rights had been purportedly violated by Israel.6 17 The
two States, however, resolved and settled this matter prior to the filing of
indictment against Eichmann. 6 8 Eichmann thus could not raise the viola-
tion of Argentinian rights as a defense and, at any rate, Argentina waived all
objections to the kidnapping of the accused.619 The Court also went on to
note that, in any event, that an effort by Argentina to protect a major war
criminal such as Adolf Eichmann would constitute an abuse of sovereignty
and would not be accorded legal recognition.620
D. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Attorney Servatius argued that there was a lack of connection be-
tween Israel and Eichmann's victims and, in the absence of a "recognized
linking point," Israel lacked authority to prosecute and inflict punishment
on Eichmann for "foreign" offenses. 621 Servatius contended that jurisdiction
traditionally had been based on the territorial principle and accordingly was
properly vested in any of the eighteen States on whose soil Eichmann car-
ried out his alleged delicts.622
The District Court found a clear connection between the charge of
exterminating the Jewish people and the State of Israel.623 The Declaration
of the Establishment of the State of Israel recognized Israel as the "birth-
615 See id. at 59.
616 See id. at 63-64.
617 See id. at 62.
618 See id. at 63.
619 See id. at 63, 70. A fugitive offender only possessed immunity from prosecution
under the specialty principle of international extradition law. This permits an indi-
vidual to object in the event that he or she is prosecuted for an offense other than
the crime for which he or she was extradited. Id. at 76.
620 See id. at 74. The fact that this prosecution violated Argentina's statute of limi-
tations was not binding on the separate sovereign jurisdiction of Israel. Id. at 79.
The District Court ruling on Eichmann's abduction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 303-308.
621 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 50.
622 See id. at 53-54.
623 See id. at 52.
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place of the Jewish people"624 and the United Nations General Assembly, in
1948, noted that the establishment of Israel was a manifestation of the "nat-
ural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other
nations in their own sovereign State. '625 In addition to this international
recognition of the connection between Israel and the Jewish people, there
was a close relationship between Israel and the Holocaust; roughly half of
the Israeli population had immigrated from Europe, either before or imme-
diately following the war.626 Many of these individuals also lost loved ones
as a result of the depredations of the Third Reich. 62 7 In addition, the Jewish
population of Palestine participated in the Allied struggle to liberate Europe
from the Nazi scourge and possessed the same prerogative as other victori-
ous States to prosecute and to punish enemy war criminals. 628
The link between Eichmann's crimes and the State of Israel, ac-
cording to the District Court, was thus indisputable; the assertion of juris-
diction was an expression of Israel's prerogative to protect its vital national
interests.6 29 Eichmann's aspirations extended to the extermination of the
Jews throughout the world, including those in Palestine.6 30 The District
Court stressed that to claim that there is "no connection is like cutting away
a tree root and branch and saying to the trunk: 'I have not hurt you."' 63'
The District Court also reasoned that prior to the establishment of
the State of Israel, the Jewish population in Palestine constituted a "poten-
tial State," which eventually attained sovereign status.6 32 The lack of sover-
eignty during World II made it impossible for the Jews of Palestine to enact
a criminal law condemning the Nazi crimes.633 Israel had inherited the sov-
ereign status of the British Mandate and the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Act "filled a need" in protecting interests which had not been
previously addressed.634
624 Id.
625 Id.
626 See id. at 53.
627 See id.
628 See id.
629 See id. at 54.
630 See id.
631 Id.
632 See id. at 56.
633 See id.
634 Id. The District Court noted that the entire political landscape of Europe had
been altered since the termination of World War II, but that this had not been
invoked by the accused to bar the assertion of jurisdiction by these countries. Id. at
55.
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According to the Court, Israel also possessed a "natural right" to
"punish" an offender who had harmed its interests. 635 In the event that the
Gypsy survivors of the Holocaust had established a State, the District Court
noted that there was no principle of international law that would have de-
nied this new entity the "inherent power" to prosecute the "destroyers of its
people who fell into its hands." 636 Similarly, the State of Israel was carrying
out the "right of the Jewish people to punish the criminals who killed its
sons with intent to put an end to the survival of this people... this power
conforms to the subsisting principles of the law of nations. 637
The District Court parenthetically noted that the International Court
of Justice decision in the Lotus Case recognized the assertion of extra-terri-
torial jurisdiction. 638 The Supreme Court's affirmation of the District
Court's ruling relied on Lotus in holding that State sovereignty "demands
the preclusion of any presumption that there is a restriction in its [a State's]
independence. ' 639 The Supreme Court further noted that even if it was true
that the territorial principle of criminal law was firmly established, it is "no
less true that in almost all such States penal jurisdiction has been extended
... so as to embrace offences committed outside its territory."6 This asser-
tion of extra-territorial jurisdiction only was limited by an explicit prohibi-
tory doctrine of international law; there was no such rule limiting Israel's
sovereign cognizance over Adolf Eichmann.641 At any rate, the Supreme
Court noted that, in the absence of an international treaty vesting a right in
635 Id. at 57.
636 Id. at 56. Cf. Id. at 57. (The right of an injured group to punish offenders for a
crime committed against them by an offender was only limited by the absence of
sovereignty. In the event that the people later achieves political sovereignty in any
territory, "it may exercise such sovereignty for the enforcement of its natural right
to punish the offender who injured it.") Id. at 57.
637 Id. at 57. The District Court proclaimed that the fact that the Jewish people
"changed from object to subject, from the victim of racial crime to the possessor of
authority to punish the criminals, is a great historic right that cannot be abrogated."
Id.
638 See id. (citing and discussing Lotus, P.C.I.J., Series A, no. 10, p. 18 (France v.
Turkey 1927) (French ship Lotus collided with Turkish vessel outside Turkish terri-
torial waters. Eight Turkish citizens drowned. The officer on watch on the Lotus
was arrested by Turkish authorities. The International Court of Justice recognized
the competence of Turkey to enact a criminal statute covering the negligent con-
duct of a French citizen while on duty as officer-of-the-watch of a French ship)).
639 Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 284.
640 Id. at 284.
641 See id. at 284-285.
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the accused, standing to protest Israel's extra-territorial jurisdiction was
vested in the aggrieved States rather than in the accused. 642 In this instance,
West Germany, as well as other European States, had failed to express an
interest in bringing Eichmann to trial.64 3
The Israeli District Court also based its jurisdiction on the "univer-
sal character of the crimes in question" which were directed at the "extermi-
nation of the Jewish people."644 The Court contended that there was no
doubt, in light of the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Genocide
Convention and the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice,
that the crimes committed by the Hitlerite regime against the Jewish and
other peoples 645 constituted the crime of genocide within the meaning of the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide. 64 6 Eichmann's delicts were not directed solely against the victims of
Nazi oppression; they "struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the
conscience of nations" and constituted "grave offences against the law of
nations itself. '647
The District Court stressed that the International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide affirmed that geno-
cide was a crime under international law whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war.648 This instrument had been unanimously adopted
by the United Nations which attested to the document's universal character
as the embodiment of principles binding upon States under international
642 See id. at 286.
643 See id. at 287. The Supreme Court did not center its discussion on Israel's
assertion of jurisdiction under the protective (of interests) and passive personality
(identity of victims) principles. The Court noted that the Lotus case provided the
most coherent theory since among the victims were non-Jewish groups such as
Poles, Slovenes, Czechs and Gypsies. The Supreme Court, however, noted that "we
fully agree with every word said by the Court on this subject." Id. at 304.
644 Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 26.
645 See id. at 34.
646 See id. at 39, discussing the International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. See Genocide Convention, supra note 108.
The District Court noted that "inasmuch as it is a crime under the law of nations
[crimes against the Jewish People], Israel's legislative authority and judicial juris-
diction in this matter is based upon the law of nations." Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra
note 12, at 39.
647 Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 26.
648 See id. at 34 (quoting Genocide Convention). See also Genocide Convention,
supra note 108.
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customary law as well as the terms of the Treaty. 649 In the absence of an
international criminal court, each country was obligated to enforce these
strong strictures of transnational law; the jurisdiction to enforce this law
accordingly was "universal. '650
The District Court argued that the Convention was meant to apply
to cases of genocide that occurred following the ratification of the Treaty,
and did not constrain the exercise of Israeli jurisdiction with regards to the
crimes committed by Eichmann during the Nazi era.651 In particular, Article
Six, which limited jurisdiction over genocide to the State on whose territory
the genocidal acts were committed, did not limit Israel 's power to prose-
cute Eichmann for genocide under international customary law.652 At any
rate, the District Court argued that Article Six was a compulsory minimum
which did not limit the prerogative of Signatory States to exercise their
existing powers within the limits of customary international law, including
the exercise of universal jurisdiction.653
The Supreme Court affirmed Israel's assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion, noting that the crimes attributed to Eichmann possessed an "interna-
tional character" and that the "harmful and murderous effects were so
embracing and widespread as to shake the international community to its
very foundation. '654 The State of Israel therefore was entitled to assert uni-
versal jurisdiction and to prosecute the accused in its "capacity of a guard-
ian of international law and as an agent for its enforcement."
655
649 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 25.
650 Id. at 25 [italics omitted]. The Court noted that these crimes are not merely
delicts under Israeli law, but are offenses against the laws of nations. Id. at 29.
Maritime nations traditionally acted on the principle of universality of jurisdiction
in regards to piracy. Id. at 26.
651 See id. at 36.
652 See id. The report of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations appended a
statement that Article Six does not affect the right of a State to prosecute before its
own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the State. Id. at 37.
Article Six, according to the District Court, did not constitute part of the principles
of customary law which were binding, absent the application of the Convention. Id.
at 36.
653 See id. at 38-39.
654 Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 304.
655 Id. The Supreme Court noted that Eichmann's crimes extended to numerous
countries and that this "drains the territorial principle of all content in the present
case and justifies Israel in assuming criminal jurisdiction by virtue of the 'univer-
sal' principle." Id. at 303. The States which possessed territorial jurisdiction were
uninterested in prosecuting Eichmann and, at any rate, Israel was unable to make a
rational decision as to which of these countries were best positioned to prosecute
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E. Retroactivity
The District Court also addressed the allegation that the Nazi And
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act constituted retroactive punishment
and therefore was contrary to international legal principles. 6 6 The Tribunal
stressed that the Statute did not create a new crime unknown in Nazi Ger-
many or in German-occupied territories. 657 In fact, these acts constituted
crimes under the laws of all civilized nations, including Germany, long
before the Nazi rise to power; and the perpetrators of these offenses could
not possibly claim that they were unaware that the acts were penal of-
fenses. 658 The Nazis' awareness of the criminality of their conduct was
demonstrated by the fact that extensive measures were undertaken to con-
ceal these crimes, including the exhumation and cremation of corpses and
the destruction of German archives. 65 9 A law that punished Nazis and Nazi
collaborators thus complemented, rather than conflicted with the rules of
"natural justice. '660
The District Court reiterated that the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Act merely affirmed existing principles of international
law.66' At any rate, the prohibition on retroactive punishment was not a
limitation on sovereignty under international law and it would be "difficult
to find a more convincing instance of a just retroactive law than the legisla-
tion providing for the punishment of crimes against . . . the Jewish peo-
ple. '662 Eichmann was charged with carrying out the plan for the Final
Solution of the Jews: "Can anyone in his right mind doubt the absolute
criminality of such acts?" 663
The Supreme Court affirmed the reasoning of the District Court and
held that there was no prohibition on retroactive punishment under interna-
tional law. 664 The Supreme Court agreed that the "sense of justice generally
recoils" from punishing an individual for acts which were not prohibited at
the accused. Id. Israel, in fact, was the most convenient forum in that it was the
location of most of the witnesses and relevant documents. Id.
656 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 22.
657 See id. at 22-23.
658 See id. In contrast, Hitler's draconian decrees which condoned Eichmann's
criminal conduct had been set aside with retroactive effect by the German courts.
Id.
659 See id.
660 Id.
661 See id. at 39-40.
662 Id. at 42.
663 Id.
664 See Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 282.
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the time of their commission, but the "sense of justice must necessarily
recoil even more from the non-punishment of the person who participated
in such outrages, for he cannot argue... at the moment of acting he was not
aware that he was violating deeply-rooted universal moral values. ' 665 In this
case, the Supreme Court noted that the argument that the accused was una-
ware of the criminal character of his acts faltered in light of the fact that the
acts punished under the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act
were well-recognized to be contrary to the law of nations from "time
immemorial. 666
F. Act of State
Robert Servatius argued that an Israeli Court could not sit in judg-
ment over acts carried out in the course of Eichmann's authoritative respon-
sibilities as an official of the German government absent the consent of the
sovereign German State. 667 He noted that it was a fundamental rule of in-
ternational law that a State may not judge acts undertaken on behalf of
another sovereign State.668
The District Court held that the Act of State defense for acts con-
demned as criminal under international law had been abrogated by the Nu-
remberg Charter, its judgment, the United Nations and by the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. 669
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Act of State defense does not
shield a governmental official from liability for crimes prohibited by the
law of nations, particularly odious delicts such as crimes against human-
ity.670 Such acts were outside the sovereign jurisdiction of the State that
ordered or ratified their commission, and those participating in such con-
duct were personally accountable. 671 Eichmann claimed that his acts were
consistent with the law of the Third Reich.672 However, the Supreme Court
pointed out that West German courts had ruled that the decrees of the Nazi
665 Id.
666 Id. at 283.
667 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 44.
668 See id. at 45.
669 See id. at 45-46. The District Court noted that Germany bore moral, as well as,
legal responsibility for crimes committed as "its own 'acts of State,' including the
crimes attributed to the accused." This, however, did not detract "one iota from the
personal responsibility of the accused for his acts." Id. at 47.
670 See Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 309-310.
671 See id. at 510.
672 See id. at 312. The Supreme Court noted that the Final Solution of the Jews
was not embodied in a personal decree or order issued by Adolf Hitler. Id. at 311.
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regime were a nullity.673 The Supreme Court ruled that the "discriminatory
and plunderous decrees" of Germany were not "laws in the contemplation
of international law" and "in no manner render these terrible crimes valid or
absolve those who participated in committing them from the personal re-
sponsibility they bear." 674
G. Superior Orders
Robert Servatius contended that Eichmann acted in accordance with
superior orders675 and that he was inculcated with "blind obedience based
on boundless faith" in the wisdom of the leadership of the Third Reich. 676
Servatius argued that loyalty was the fundamental obligation of a citizen
and that a slim line separated those who emerged victorious and received a
"decoration" and the vanquished, who were consigned to the "gallows. 6 77
The District Court observed that the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Act specifically abrogated the superior orders defense.678 Sec-
tion 1 1 limited superior orders to mitigation of punishment to those in-
stances in which the orders were not manifestly unlawful and specified that
the Court shall not impose a lighter punishment than imprisonment for ten
years.679 The District Court stressed that the superior orders defense had
been rejected by the Nuremberg judgment, and by all civilized countries,
and that this view had been endorsed by the United Nations. 680 The Third
Reich also limited the superior orders defense and abrogated the defense in
those instances in which a defendant knowingly carried out an illegal or-
der.68' There was little doubt that Eichmann was aware that the directives
for the extermination of the Jews was manifestly unlawful and that this
order, as well as those providing for arbitrary discrimination against the
673 See id. at 312.
674 Id.
675 See Dist. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 253.
676 Id. at 254.
677 Id. The District Court noted that Eichmann was attempting "to turn an order for
the extermination of millions of innocent people from a crime into a political act in
order thus to exempt from personal criminal responsibility those who gave and
those who carried out the order." Id.
678 See id. at 255-256 (quoting Nazi Collaborators Act), supra note 192, §§ 8,
11 (a).
679 See id at 257 (quoting Nazi Collaborators Act), supra note 192, art. 11.
680 See id. at 257.
681 See id.
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Jews, was "contrary to the basic principles of law and justice;" the accused
knowingly "engaged in criminal acts on a colossal scale. '682
Eichmann was thus statutorily precluded from pleading obedience
to a manifestly unlawful order in his efforts to show mitigation.683 The Dis-
trict Court stressed that Eichmann's legal liability was paralleled by his
moral myopia which led the accused to carry out his duties with "inner
conviction," "whole-heartedly and willingly. '684 He possessed a "fanatical
belief' that he was fulfilling an "important national mission." 685 The Dis-
trict Court noted that there was not a single case in which the accused
demonstrated "any sign of human feeling in his dealing with Jewish af-
fairs.1686 His activities "displayed indefatigable energy, verging on frenzy,
to advance the "Final Solution. '687 Eichmann fervently believed that the
Jews were the enemies of the Reich and needed to be destroyed, so he
devoted himself to cleansing the continent of Jews. 688
The Court concluded that Eichmann was central in the Final Solu-
tion and his guilt was not lessened by the fact that others participated in this
criminal enterprise. 689 His entire testimony was intended to minimize his
responsibility and, when confronted by documented cases of culpability, he
fell back on the defense of superior orders.690 The Court concluded that this
subterfuge faltered in the face of Eichmann's enthusiastic efforts to exter-
minate the Jews. 691
The Supreme Court agreed with the District Tribunal that the order
for the physical extermination of the Jews was manifestly illegal and that
Eichmann was aware that he was complicit in the "perpetration of the most
grave and horrible crimes. ''692 The Court also stressed that Eichmann was
not threatened or pressured into obedience; he acted with "full zeal and
682 Id. at 258. This was not a "single crime, but a consecutive series of crimes
committed over the course of many years. The accused had more than enough time
to reflect on his deeds and to desist from them. But he did not stop, and as time
went on he even intensified his activity. Id.
683 See id. at 258.
684 Id. at 263.
685 Id. at 265.
686 Id.
687 Id. at 266.
688 See id. at 271.
689 See id.
690 See id at 272.
691 See id.
692 Sup. Ct. Judgment, supra note 12, at 315.
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devotion to the task." 693 Eichmann acted "independently" and, at times,
"even exceeded" his duties.694
X. SOME OBSERVATIONS
Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped, removed from Argentina, prose-
cuted in Israel under an extra-territorial and retroactive statute, and exe-
cuted for crimes against the Jewish people. 695 Legal scholars almost
uniformly endorsed the reasoning of the Israeli courts, affirming the legality
of Eichmann's prosecution and punishment.696 The judgment's assertion of
universal jurisdiction over genocide elevated the decision into a seminal
contribution to twentieth century international jurisprudence. 697 This princi-
ple has evolved into a fundamental mechanism for combating serious
crimes under international law and, of late, has been the subject of discus-
sion devoted to establishing standards and limiting principles. 698 The judg-
ment also affirms that the perpetrators of international crimes may not seek
shelter behind the shield of national sovereignty, superior orders or official
status.699 The recognition of an international interest, which transcends the
interests of States, established the foundation for the creation of criminal
tribunals for Yugoslavia 7°° and Rwanda70' and the Statute for a proposed
international criminal court. 702
693 Id. at 318.
694 Id. at 313.
695 See supra notes 621-666 and accompanying texts.
696 See L.C. Green, Legal Issues of the Eichmann Trial, 37 TuL. L. REV. 641
(1963).
697 See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEX. L. REv. 785, 789-90, 812-15 (1988).
698 See PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCI-
PLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001). Genocide is listed as a crime which
should be subject to universal jurisdiction. Id. at prin. 2, 29. The Princeton Princi-
ples would appear to recognize the validity of Israel's claim of universal jurisdic-
tion. Id. at prin. 8, 32 [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES].
699 See supra notes 668-694 and accompanying texts.
700 See United Nations Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the For-
mer Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993).
701 See U.N.S.C. Res. 955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
702 See United Nations Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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The proceedings, however, remain controversial. Commentators
avoid addressing the unprecedented proposition that Israel was justified in
extra-territorially extending its jurisdiction to protect the Jewish people.703
The notion that race, ethnicity or religion provides a basis for legal jurisdic-
tion serves as a prescription for the arbitrary assertion of legal prerogatives
and conflict between countries.704 Eichmann's prosecution for crimes
against the Jewish people was particularly problematic when paired with
the claim of universal jurisdiction over a crime which was characterized as
being directed against global humanity and civilization, not only against
Jews.705 Yet, a resort to an international tribunal was dismissed by Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion as an admission of moral and political weak-
ness.706 There was also apprehension that an international tribunal might
display the same lack of regard for the suffering of the Jewish people as had
been displayed by the International Military at Nuremberg, which subordi-
nated the issue of genocide to a concern with Nazi aggression.707
In the end, Eichmann, although a central cog in the murderous Nazi
machine, was not the malevolent "master mind" portrayed by the prosecu-
tion.708 The prosecutorial focus on Eichmann may have drawn attention
from the lesson to be learned from the horror and tragedy experienced by
those survivors testifying in court. These stories stand as a stark statement
that thousands of Germans were complicit in or condoned Nazi crimes.
Eichmann, without a doubt, passionately pursued the extermination of the
Jews. But, in the end, his activities catalogue the widespread guilt of
thousands of individuals who also carried out commands. Eichmann's con-
viction should have served as a catalyst, rather than a conclusion to the
703 See Hans W. Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects, 1961 DuKE L. J.
400, 416-20 (1961).
704 See supra notes 623-631 and accompanying texts.
705 See supra notes 644-655 and accompanying texts. The often critical reaction of
secularized American Jews who resented this involuntary imposition of a religious
identity is discussed in Pnina Lahav, The Eichmann Trial, The Jewish Question,
and the American-Jewish Intelligentsia, 72 B.U. L. REv. 555 (1992).
706 See YosAL RoGAT, THE EICHMANN TRiAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 16 n.11
(1961).
707 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 275-276.
708 Eichmann's invocation of superior orders, and his refusal to accept responsibil-
ity, contributed to diminishing the credibility of the contention that he was the
primary person in the Final Solution thereby depriving the Israelis of the satisfac-
tion of achieving a measure of retributive justice. See generally ARENDT, supra
note 80, at 276-277.
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pursuit and prosecution of Nazi war criminals, and should have stimulated a
discussion of the collective culpability of the German people.7"9
The Eichmann judgment starkly challenged the concept of State
sovereignty. The Court conveniently adjudged the Third Reich as a criminal
country whose laws and policies contravened the international code of con-
duct. The argument that Eichmann was aware of the criminal nature of his
acts overlooked that history is marked by malevolent practices, such as
slavery and apartheid, which were institutionalized components of State
policy. A legal analysis which fails to address the human capacity to engage
in and justify cruel and callous violations of human rights impedes our un-
derstanding of the processes which propel these atrocities. Eichmann of-
fered self-serving statements recognizing the monstrosity of the Final
Solution. However, the imputation of criminal liability based on the notion
that Eichmann must have comprehended the cataclysmic character of his
crimes lacks persuasive power. He was rewarded and recognized for his
role in repressing the Jews and never hesitated or flinched in his fanatical
zeal. 710
One lesson to be drawn from Eichmann is that "evil" is not inevita-
bly malevolent; it may be an expression of the empty and unfulfilled per-
sonality who adopts an ideology to provide direction and destination for his
or her life. The power and potency associated with authority and power
provides animation and excitement to these desicated souls. The pain in-
flicted on others is an expression of their own internal pain and resentment.
In this sense, Eichmann personifies the totalitarian and terrorist personality
who derives satisfaction from slaughter. It was this indifference, distance
and refusal to concede both knowledge and responsibility, which remains
coldly chilling.7 1'
A frequently overlooked aspect of the trial was the decision to exe-
cute Eichmann, a judgment that most certainly contravened the contempo-
rary canon of international jurisprudence. 71 2 There was some muted
opposition to Eichmann's execution based upon moral, religious and spiri-
tual injunctions against the taking of a life, and on the pragmatic ground
that life imprisonment might prove a more difficult and demanding pen-
709 See ROGAT, supra note 706, at 12-14.
710 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 276-278 and accompanying texts.
711 See id. at 276-279.
712 See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 698, at prin. 10(1), 34. (Extradition may
be refused where the death penalty or cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
"likely" will be imposed.)
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alty.7 13 The most telling point was that the sacrifice of six million should
not be seen to be avenged by the hanging of a single egregious and evil
man.7 14 In retrospect, there is little reason to believe that Eichmann's execu-
tion served as an effective deterrent to the commission of large-scale viola-
tions of human rights. 715
There was substantial precedent for prosecuting Nazi war criminals
before domestic courts.716An Israeli Court nevertheless may have been inca-
pable of meeting the considerable challenge of describing and documenting
the Final Solution.717 Some claimed that the proceedings seemed scripted,
the trial confused and cluttered by irrelevant evidence, and the verdict
planned and predictable. This resulted in sullied and stained legal proceed-
ings.718 Hannah Arendt went so far as to suggest that it may have been
preferable to assassinate Eichmann in Argentina, and for the assailant to
present him or herself for trial. This would have forced global society to
confront the justifiability of Jewish retribution and would have avoided the
errors and excesses of a "show trial" in Israel.719 A multi-national proceed-
ing also may have resulted in a judgment that was not tarnished by the
controversial circumstances surrounding the verdict of the Israeli courts.720
In the end, an international court was arguably required whose stat-
ure and status would support a claim of universal jurisdiction and provide
credibility and legitimacy to the verdict.72 1 There is no denying the justifia-
bility of the actions of Israel, the proceedings nevertheless provide strong
support for the creation of an international criminal court.722 Genocide is of
713 See SEGEV, supra note 177, at 361-362 (petition organized by Professor Shmuel
Hugo Bergmann of the Hebrew University).
714 See id. at 363-364 (petition requesting commutation petition submitted to Presi-
dent Yitzhak Ben-Zvi).
715 See supra notes 700-702 and accompanying texts.
716 See Nicholas Kittrie, A Post Mortem of the Eichmann Case-The Lessons for
International Law, 55 J. CRnr. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 16, 27 (1964).
717 See ARENDT, supra note 80, at 274.
718 See id. at 264-266.
719 Id. at 264-266. Arendt recounts the case of Shalm Schwartzbard who, on May
25, 1926, shot and killed Simon Petlyura, a Ukrainian leader during the Russian
civil war who conducted pogroms resulting in one hundred thousand victims. Id. at
265. In 1921, the Armenian Tehlirian assassinated Talatt Bey in Berlin, one of the
principal figures in the extermination of 600,000 Armenians in Turkey. Id. at 265-
266.
720 See Kittrie, supra note 716, at 28.
721 See id.
722 See Rome Statute, supra note 702 and accompanying text.
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international concern and its punishment should not depend upon the
strength and sustenance of a single State.723 Equally as important is the fact
that the voices of Eichmann's non-Jewish victims were only heard in muf-
fled and muted tones in the Jerusalem courtroom.7 2 4
XI. CONCLUSION
Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped from Argentina and involuntarily
spirited to Israel.72 At the request of Argentina, the United Nations Security
Council convened and adopted a compromise resolution which both upheld
respect for the sovereign authority of Argentina and stressed the obligation
of States to cooperate in bringing war criminals to the bar of justice.726
Eichmann then was prosecuted and convicted under the Nazi and
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act for crimes against the Jewish people
and of the subsidiary offenses of crimes against humanity and war
crimes.727 Much of the trial was devoted to documenting the depredations of
the Final Solution through eyewitness testimony.728 Eichmann claimed that
he was a mere transportation expert who followed superior orders in di-
recting the deportation of Jews to the death camps.729 On cross-examina-
tion, Gideon Hausner established that Eichmann had been involved in a
range of repressive activities, but the accused insisted that he had acted
pursuant to the authorization and direction of superiors.730 Eichmann was
convicted on all counts and remains the first and only individual executed
in the history of the State of Israel.7 3 ' The District and Supreme Courts
dismissed challenges to Eichmann's conviction based on judicial bias,732 his
abduction,733 and the extraterritoriality734 and retroactivity of the Israeli stat-
ute,735 Act of state736 and superior orders. 737
723 See ARENDT, supra note 12, at 273-274.
724 See generally Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 199, at 480-481.
725 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying texts.
726 See supra notes 123-165 and accompanying texts.
727 See supra notes 207-220 and accompanying texts.
728 See supra notes 299-406 and accompanying texts.
729 See supra notes 409-444 and accompanying texts.
730 See supra notes 445-503 and accompanying texts.
731 See supra notes 572-606 and accompanying texts.
732 See supra notes 63-107 and accompanying texts.
733 See supra notes 614-620 and accompanying texts.
734 See supra notes 621-655 and accompanying texts.
735 See supra notes 656-666 and accompanying texts.
736 See supra notes 668-674 and accompanying texts.
THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN
The Eichmann judgment was a catalyst for ushering in an age of
global justice devoted to the development of an international jurisprudence
dedicated to the punishment of severe and serious international offenses.7 18
The decision, however, contained seeds of dissonance and disarray. State
intervention in the affairs of other sovereign nations, the assertion of extra-
territorial and universal jurisdiction by the judiciary of single States, the
substitution of ethnic and racial identity for national citizenship, a disregard
of international juridical institutions and a concern with substance at the
expense of transnational legal procedures all continue to haunt and to
threaten the integrity of international law and global stability.739
737 See supra notes 675-694 and accompanying texts.
738 See supra notes 697-702 and accompanying texts.
739 See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN
AFF. 86 (2001). Ironically, Israeli government officials are now themselves fearful
of the assertion of universal jurisdiction over alleged misdeeds. See Clyde Haber-
man, Israel is Wary of Long Reach in Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2001 at
Al.
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